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The More Things Change, the More They 
Stay the Same: Online Platforms and 
Consumer Equality 




Title II of the Civil Rights Act, along with its counterpart state laws, have 
protected the rights of racial minorities in the United States for decades.  
Section 1981 has guaranteed contract rights for all people, regardless of race, 
since 1868.  But times are changing.  Racial discrimination claims against 
21st century technology companies face challenges when brought under 
existing laws.  Even the relatively current Communications Decency Act 
(CDA) is unhelpful to consumers attempting to seek redress from online 
platforms.  In this article, we analyze the only cases of consumer 
discrimination brought against providers of the sharing economy and 
highlight some of the obstacles faced by plaintiffs.  Next, we evaluate state 
and federal laws commonly relied upon by plaintiffs in traditional consumer 
discrimination cases.  Our unique contribution involves a detailed review of 
outcomes of claims at various stages of litigation from motions to dismiss and 
motions for summary judgment to trials and appeals in both state and federal 
court.  The study’s results provide lawyers, practitioners, and policymakers 
with information about litigants’ success rates and inform our proposals for 
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amending the law to accommodate consumer discrimination claims against 
online platforms. 
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“Which monkey is gonna stay on the couch?” asked “Kate.”1  “Get your 
things and get the f--- out of my house.”2  The African American men who 
had booked accommodations in her town home complied and prepared to 
leave, but Kate wasn’t finished.  As they packed their things, the young Airbnb 
host labeled them criminals and stated that she did not feel safe with them in 
her home.3  She complained that the party of five was too large and when they 
replied that the listing allowed for up to five people, retorted with the 
“monkey” comment.4 
Flying in from all over the U.S. to meet in New York, the men used the 
website Airbnb.com5 to secure lodging for their stay.6  According to Meshawn 
Cisero, one member of the party, things “felt off” from the moment they 
arrived at the front door around eleven o’clock in the evening, beginning with 
their encounter of a resident not mentioned in the listing.7  As they walked 
upstairs, the group met a man, described as the host’s spouse, who was “very 
 
 1. Dominique Mosbergen, Airbnb Host Kicks Out Black Guests After Calling Them ‘Monkeys,’ 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/airbnb-host-black-
guests-monkeys-racist_n_5cf635e4e4b0e346ce845be3. 
 2. Timothy Bella, ‘Which Monkey is Gonna Stay on the Couch?’: Airbnb Host Kicks Out Black 
Guests in Racist Exchange, THE WASHINGTON POST  (June 3, 2019, 3:45 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/03/airbnb-racism-host-monkey-black-men-new-
york/?utm_term=.84c69e0c9b67. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Mosbergen, supra note 1. 
 5. About Us, AIRBNB, https://press.airbnb.com/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).  Airbnb is 
a provider at the forefront of the platform economy.  Id.  Since its founding in 2008, it has risen to 
become one of the most prominent platforms of the platform economy.  Id.  Airbnb bills itself as “a 
trusted community marketplace for people to list, discover, and book unique accommodations around 
the world” that “connects people to unique travel experiences, at any price point, in more than 34,000 
cities and 191 countries.”  Laura W. Murphy, Airbnb’s Work to Fight Discrimination and Build 
Inclusion, AIRBNB.COM: THE AIRBNB BLOG 2 (Sept. 8, 2016), https://blog.atairbnb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/REPORT_Airbnbs-Work-to-Fight-Discrimination-and-Build-Inclusion.pdf. 
 6. Christina Capatides, Group of Black Friends Kicked Out of Airbnb by Host Who Called Them 
“Monkeys,” CBS NEWS (June 4, 2019, 5:49 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/group-of-black-
friends-kicked-out-of-airbnb-by-host-who-called-them-monkeys-airbnbwhileblack/. 
 7. Aliya Semper Ewing, #AirbnbWhileBlack: Host Calls Black Men ‘Monkeys’ and ‘Criminals’ 
Before Kicking Them Out [Updated], THE ROOT (JUNE 1, 2019, 8:15 PM), 
https://www.theroot.com/airbnbwhileblack-host-calls-black-men-monkeys-and-1835179161 
(“‘There was someone’s father with a dog [and they weren’t] described in the posting,’ said Cisero. . . .  
The posting noted the owner and spouse would be on site but didn’t mention any additional 
residents.”). 
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polite” to them and would be so for the duration of their brief stay.8  The host’s 
spouse showed them to their rooms—“two private bedrooms on the top floor 
of an owner-on-site Upper East Side residence.”9 
Getting prepared for an evening out, the friends began playing music.10  
Soon afterward, they received their first warning from the host’s spouse, 
despite having been previously told that “noise shouldn’t be a problem 
because they were on the third floor.”11  The men turned off the music and 
continued to socialize.12  It was around the time that a fifth friend arrived at 
the residence when they received a second warning from the host’s spouse.13  
Shortly after one a.m., Kate confronted the friends.14 
Following their removal from the premises, the men contacted Airbnb, 
and through its “Open Doors” policy, the company assisted in providing the 
group with a new place to stay.15  It took further action to have Kate removed 
as a host from the platform.16  In a Reddit post dated June 1, 2019, a user 
claiming to be Kate’s boyfriend stated that Airbnb deleted their account, 
causing them to lose their bookings.17  But the damage was done.  Two days 
later, Kenneth Simpson, a member of the group, told The Washington Post 
that he remained upset and that the incident was “another real-life situation 
where we had to experience the feeling of hopelessness as a black 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Capatides, supra note 6. 
 10. Ewing, supra note 7 (“[This] was also stated on the Airbnb listing page for the private 
bedrooms.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Mosbergen, supra note 1. 
 15. See Bella, supra note 2; see also Fighting Discrimination and Creating a World Where Anyone 
Can Belong Anywhere, AIRBNB.COM: THE AIRBNB BLOG (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://blog.atairbnb.com/fighting-discrimination-and-creating-a-world-where-anyone-can-belong-
anywhere/ (“Starting October 1[, 2016], if a Guest anywhere in the world feels like they have been 
discriminated against in violation of our policy—in trying to book a listing, having a booking canceled, 
or in any other interaction with a host—we will find that Guest a similar place to stay if one is available 
on Airbnb, or if not, we will find them an alternative accommodation elsewhere.  This program will 
also apply retroactively to any Guest who reported discrimination prior to today.  All of these Guests 
will be offered booking assistance for their next trip.”). 
 16. Ewing, supra note 7 (“Update: 6/2/19, 7:20 a.m. ET: Airbnb public affairs rep, Ben Breit, gave 
the below-written statement to The Root . . . ‘We have a strict nondiscrimination policy, which we are 
enforcing to remove the host from our platform.’”). 
 17. TooN (@Kartoon_1911), TWITTER (June 2, 2019, 10:03 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
Kartoon_1911/status/1135411639707197440 (hidden under sensitive material; must click “View”). 
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Corroborating this and other anecdotes in which customers of color 
experienced unfair treatment, Harvard Business School researchers conducted 
a field study and found that “guests with distinctively African American 
names are 16 percent less likely to be accepted relative to identical guests with 
distinctively white names.”19  Unfortunately, Airbnb isn’t the only online 
platform on which discrimination is revealing itself.20  Another prominent 
category of service provider in the platform economy consists of what are 
known as transportation network companies (TNCs).21  TNCs include entities 
such as Uber and Lyft.22  As with African American guests on Airbnb, African 
American passengers on Uber and Lyft are confronted by the prospect of 
discrimination.23  In fact, a team of researchers from the nation’s leading 
universities conducted a field experiment that concluded as much.24 
The study involved research assistants of different races and genders who 
hailed rides on Uber and Lyft in Boston, Massachusetts and Seattle, 
 
 18. Bella, supra note 2. 
 19. Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing 
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J. 1, 1 (2017). 
 20. See Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in 
the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L. J. 1271, 1284 (2017).  There are a variety of alternative names for 
the new business model, including “sharing economy,” “gig economy,” “1099 economy,” etc.  Id.  
This essay shall adopt the term “platform economy” because  the term best captures the intrinsic nature 
of the relationship between the online platform and relevant businesses.  Id. n.73.  Furthermore, the 
term properly “encompasses [the] growing number of digitally enabled activities in business, politics, 
and social interaction.”  Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, 32 ISSUES 
IN SCI. & TECH. 3 (Spring 2016), https://issues.org/the-rise-of-the-platform-economy/#:~:text=We 
%20prefer%20the%20term%20%E2%80%9Cplatform,%2C%20politics%2C%20and%20social%20
interaction.  With the traditional linear model of marketplace competition, businesses “directly create 
and control inventory via a supply chain.”  Alex Moazed, Platform Business Model—Definition / What 
is it? / Explanation, APPLICO, https://www.applicoinc.com/blog/what-is-a-platform-business-model/ 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2020).  Platform models “create[] value by facilitating exchanges between two 
or more interdependent groups, usually consumers and producers.”  Id. 
 21. Commercial Ride-Sharing, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS: THE CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. 
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_commercial_ride_sharing.htm (last updated Mar. 4, 2020). 
 22. Id.  TNCs operate by “us[ing] mobile technology to connect potential passengers with drivers 
who use their personal vehicles to provide transportation for a fee.”  Id. 
 23. See Gillian B. White, Uber and Lyft are Failing Black Riders, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/uber-lyft-and-the-false-promise-of-fair-
rides/506000/. 
 24. Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation Network Companies 1–
2 (NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 22776, 2016), https://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w22776.pdf. 
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Washington.25  Drivers for both Uber and Lyft have the option to cancel rides 
they schedule with riders, but face penalties if they do so too often.26  In 
Boston, the research assistants studied how often drivers cancelled when they 
saw that riders had “Black names” versus “White names.”27  The cancellation 
rates for Uber riders with African American-sounding names were 11.2% and 
8.4% for Black males and females respectively, while they were 4.5% and 
5.4% for males and females with White-sounding names respectively.28  With 
Lyft, male names of both races had about the same cancellation rate, and 
female African American names faced a lower cancellation rate than White 
names.29 
In Seattle, African American riders experienced longer wait times for 
their ride requests to be accepted.30  This finding was particularly significant 
in the case of Uber where the wait times for African American riders were 
30% longer than for Whites.31  Furthermore, the study found that the travel 
time for African American riders on Uber was 8% longer, adjusting for 
differences in trip length.32 
Ultimately, the study concluded that discrimination is occurring with “at 
least some drivers for both UberX and Lyft . . . on the basis of the perceived 
race of the traveler.”33  Despite the strong stance taken by providers against it, 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1. 
 27. Id. at 1–2. 
 28. Id. at 16–17.  The names were chosen from lists that were developed as part of a study wherein 
the names selected had been “strongly identified” as White or African American by a panel.  Id. at 13; 
see Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakeisha 
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 998 (2004) 
(finding that resumes with White-sounding names received 50% more interviews than resumes with 
African American-sounding names); see also Ronald Fryer & Steven Levitt, The Causes and 
Consequences of Distinctively Black Names, 119 Q. J. ECON. 767, 801 (2004) (discussing the “stark 
differences in naming patterns between Blacks and Whites”). 
 29. Ge, et al., supra note 24, at 17.  The results of both the Seattle and Boston studies appear to 
suggest Lyft drivers discriminated against riders of color less frequently than Uber drivers.  Id.  
However, this finding can be attributed to the different design of Lyft’s platform.  See id. at 19.  Lyft 
drivers see the name and photo of prospective passengers before accepting the trip request, whereas 
Uber drivers only see a passenger’s location and star rating—but not the name—before they accept.  
Id.  With no record of an acceptance, instances of discrimination on Lyft can therefore go unnoticed 
as the victim would not even know if the driver has looked at their request and profile.  See id. 
 30. Id. at 9. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 19. 
[Vol. 48: 59, 2021] The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
 
66 
racial discrimination persists as an ever-present threat in the platform 
economy.34 
What is the “platform economy?”35  Platform models of business allow 
for greater diversity of services and new opportunities for connecting with 
potential business partners and customers.36  Through “increased information 
sharing between different players and circulation of data,” online platforms 
eliminate trade barriers and open up economic systems in ways not possible 
through traditional models.37  Although some had hoped that old biases would 
not infect consumer transactions in the new platform economy, it appears that 
discrimination is often facilitated by the most fundamental aspects of the peer-
to-peer business model, namely the use of profile photos and user names.38 
At the top of Airbnb’s “diversity and belonging” page, just above a 
picture of CEO Brian Chesky, is a statement declaring discrimination to be 
the “greatest challenge” Airbnb is facing.39  Airbnb states that it “exists to 
create a world where anyone can belong anywhere.”40  Its “greatest goal” is to 
 
 34. See id.  Like Airbnb, both Uber and Lyft are aware of, and firmly denounce, discrimination on 
their platforms.  See Uber Non-Discrimination Policy, UBER.COM: LEGAL, https://www.uber.com/ 
legal/policies/non-discrimination-policy/en/ (last modified Jan. 12, 2020); Anti-Discrimination 
Policies, LYFT.COM, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/115012923767-Anti-Discrimination-
Policies (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).  In its community guidelines, Uber informs users that it does not 
tolerate discriminatory conduct based on a host of characteristics, including race and national origin.  
Uber Community Guidelines, UBER.COM: LEGAL, https://www.uber.com/legal/en/document/? 
country=india&lang=en&name=general-community-guidelines (last modified Apr. 17, 2020).  Uber’s 
non-discrimination policy reiterates its prohibition on racial discrimination and warns that “[a]ny user 
found to have violated this prohibition will lose access to the Uber platform.”  Uber Non-
Discrimination Policy, supra.  Similarly, Lyft’s policy emphasizes “maintaining an inclusive and 
welcoming community” and that “[d]iscrimination of any kind may result in the offender’s immediate 
deactivation.”  Anti-Discrimination Policies, supra. 
 35. See, e.g., Leong & Belzer, supra note 20; Kenny & Zysman, supra note 20. 
 36. See Leong & Belzer, supra note 20; Kenny & Zysman, supra note 20. 
 37. Daisy Chan, Freek Voortman & Sarah Rogers, The Rise of the Platform Economy, DELOITTE 
1, 2 (2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/humancapital/deloitte-nl-
hc-reshaping-work-conference.pdf. 
 38. See Ge, et al., supra note 24, at 18–20; see also Anne Elizabeth Brown, Ridehail Revolution: 
Ridehail Travel and Equity in Los Angeles, UCLA 140–41 (2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
UCLA) (available at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4r22m57k) (suggesting modifying rider and 
photo names policies as means to reduce discrimination on ridehail platforms). 
 39. Our Diverse Global Community Makes Airbnb Possible, AIRBNB.COM, https://www.airbnb. 
com/diversity (last visited Sept. 20, 2020). 
 40. Airbnb, Inc., 2020 Airbnb Update, HOSPITALITYNET (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www. 
hospitalitynet.org/news/4096620.html. 
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“build[] an inclusive platform for all hosts and guests.”41  To that end, Airbnb 
has taken steps to remedy the problem of discrimination on its platform. 
In 2016, the organization reached out to Laura Murphy, former head of 
the American Civil Liberties Union’s legislative office in Washington, D.C., 
to review aspects of the company’s diversity and inclusion efforts.42  Airbnb 
adopted several changes Ms. Murphy recommended.43  In particular, Airbnb’s 
stronger non-discrimination policy commits “to do more than comply with the 
minimum requirements established by law.”44  Specific guidelines for hosts 
inside the United States forbid various actions based on race, namely 
declining guests, imposing different terms or conditions on guests, or 
indicating any racial preference for or against guests when posting a listing.45 
Although previously reluctant to modify their policy, in October 2018, 
Airbnb announced a booking policy change whereby guests are no longer 
required to provide a profile photo and hosts who ask guests to provide one 
only see the photo after they accept the booking.46  In addition, hosts must 
initiate their request for a photo before they receive a reservation request.47  
Under the new policy, guests whose reservations are canceled after they 
provide a photo can file a complaint with Airbnb and hosts who violate the 
policy may be permanently banned from using the platform.48  Airbnb’s 
revised policy represents a compromise between demands from civil rights 
groups concerned about profile photos facilitating discrimination and the 
interests of rental hosts who want information about guests who have access 
to their homes.49 
While the platform economy creates new opportunities for growth, its rise 
also presents new challenges for society.50  There are increasing concerns that 
 
 41. Our Diverse Global Community Makes Airbnb Possible, supra note 39. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Murphy, supra note 5, at 28. 
 45. Id. at 29. 
 46. Sam Fulwood III, Airbnb Announces Booking Policy Change to Head Off Outcry Over 
Persistent Racial Discrimination, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 24, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://thinkprogress. 
org/airbnb-changes-photo-policy-combat-racial-discrimination-4f71c375553a/ (describing Airbnb’s 
2018 change to its photo policy). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.; see Kenney & Zysman, supra note 20 (enumerating the difficulties of adjusting to a 
platform economy); Leong & Belzer, supra note 20, at 1271 (describing the potential for 
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current law is ill-equipped to deal with the new model where platforms can be 
viewed as mere facilitators of peer-to-peer transactions between consumers 
and providers.51  Indeed, platforms differ from traditional places of public 
accommodation in the sense that they do not provide services directly to 
customers.52  Compare hotel and taxi cab companies to Airbnb and Uber, 
through which services are provided by hosts or drivers.53  In the new business 
model, there is a degree of separation between the platforms and consumers 
that may be effective in shielding them from the reach of anti-discrimination 
laws.54  Plaintiffs bringing lawsuits against online platforms are presented 
with challenges because these companies operate in what is largely a gray area 
of the law.55  Furthermore, it is unclear that current laws provide adequate 
protection for consumers of color in the brick-and-mortar marketplace.56 
We begin this paper by examining the three consumer discrimination 
cases to date brought against sharing economy platforms.  These three suits in 
which plaintiffs of color sought redress from Uber and Airbnb are analyzed in 
detail.  In Part III, we examine the effectiveness of state public 
accommodations laws in comparison with the federal laws that aim to provide 
plaintiffs with relief from consumer discrimination.  Our unique analysis of 
current law presented in Part IV explores plaintiffs’ success at different stages 
of litigation, from surviving defendants’ motions to dismiss and motions for 
summary judgment, to jury and bench trials, and finally, to appellate review 
in both state and federal court.  Suggestions for amending the law to ensure 
fairness for plaintiffs when they bring claims against platform economy 
providers are presented in Part IV. 
 
discrimination in platform economies).   
 51. See Leong & Belzer, supra note 20, at 1271 (describing the inapplicability of current 
discrimination law to the platform economy); Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against 
Discrimination in Online Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1183, 1186–87 (2017) (explaining the 
influence of platform design on customer interactions). 
 52. See Kenney & Zysman, supra note 20 (contrasting the platform economy with traditional 
companies that ship goods to consumers). 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Chitra Ramaswamy, ‘Prejudices Play Out in the Ratings We Give’–The Myth of Digital 
Equality, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2017/feb/20/airbnb-uber-sharing-apps-digital-equality; see also Levy & Barocas, supra 
note 51, at 1187 (“Platforms routinely disclaim legal responsibility for all kinds of harms propagated 
by their users against one another, and have largely been successful in so doing.”). 
 55. Levy & Barocas, supra note 51, at 1186–87. 
 56. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the history of anti-discrimination laws and their 
ineffective enforcement). 
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II. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS CLAIMS AGAINST ONLINE PLATFORMS 
We begin with a description of the only cases in which consumers have 
alleged race discrimination against online platforms.  All three cases were 
decided by federal district courts in Oregon, the District of Columbia, and 
New York. 
A. Harrington v. Airbnb 
Patricia Harrington, an African American woman residing in the state of 
Oregon,57 contacted Airbnb through her attorney, requesting to become a 
member because she was aware of the greater likelihood that she would face 
discrimination when attempting to book accommodations through the online 
platform.58 
To appreciate Ms. Harrington’s concern, it is important to understand that 
Airbnb users are divided into two types: hosts and guests.59  Hosts “create 
profiles for themselves and their property, choose their own price and 
availability, and set guidelines for guests.”60  Guests review host listings and 
may choose to initiate communication.61  Prior to the change in the company’s 
policy in October 2018, as previously mentioned, both guest and host profiles 
contained photos and reviews from previous transactions, which could be 
viewed by the parties prior to beginning a new transaction.62  If the guest 
requests to use the host’s listing and the host agrees, the two parties “use 
Airbnb to confirm travel dates and expectations, and make and receive 
payments.”63  After the guest has completed his or her stay at the host’s 
property, the two parties review each other, publishing their reviews in 
postings that are available for reference to other users in future transactions.64 
Harrington’s lawyer demanded an end to the policy requiring guests to 
provide a profile photo that hosts could see prior to accepting a booking 
 
 57. Complaint ¶ 1, Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00558-YY (D. Or. April 7, 2017). 
 58. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. 
 59. Id. ¶ 5. 
 60. Murphy, supra note 5, at 2. 
 61. Complaint, supra note 57, ¶¶ 13–14. 
 62. Fulwood, supra note 46. 
 63. Murphy, supra note 5, at 2. 
 64. Id. 
[Vol. 48: 59, 2021] The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
 
70 
request.65  Airbnb explicitly refused to change its photo policy.66  However, 
the company offered to help Harrington in securing alternative 
accommodations in the event that a host discriminated against her in the 
future.67 
Harrington filed a class action suit on March 6, 2017, in Multnomah 
County Circuit Court.68  She alleged one claim under Oregon Revised Statute 
(ORS) 659A.403 “on behalf of ‘[a]ll African-American residents of Oregon 
who are not currently, and have never been, members of Airbnb.’”69  In her 
complaint, Ms. Harrington alleged that Airbnb is directly liable for 
maintaining policies that “deny African-Americans full and equal 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of a place of public 
accommodation” and “liable for aiding and abetting its hosts in unlawful 
discrimination . . . based on protected characteristics.”70 
The case was removed to federal court, and on September 6, 2017, Airbnb 
moved to dismiss Harrington’s lawsuit based on two contentions: 1) that 
Harrington and co-plaintiffs had no claim as the lawsuit concerned “only the 
possibility of future discrimination” and 2) that Airbnb was not “a ‘place of 
public accommodation’” as defined under ORS 659A.400(1).71  The court 
agreed with Airbnb, concluding that the words “has been made,” made it clear 
that the statute only pertained to past acts of discrimination.72  Because the 
statute does not protect plaintiffs from future discrimination, the magistrate 
judge recommended dismissing Harrington’s suit without considering 
 
 65. See Complaint, supra note 57, ¶ 25. 
 66. See Fulwood, supra note 46. 
 67. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 (D. Or. 2018).  Airbnb would 
investigate any discrimination claims and take appropriate action if necessary.  Id.  Airbnb’s 
amenability to assisting Harrington may be based on the company’s awareness, through its own 
research, that minority users on its platform face difficulties in securing bookings based on their 
protected characteristics.  See Murphy, supra note 5, at 16 (“Airbnb’s research also has generally 
confirmed public reports that minorities struggle more than others to book a listing.”). 
 68. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00558-YY, 2017 WL 3392496, at *1 (D. Or. 2017). 
 69. Id. at *2. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00558-YY, 2018 WL 3148245, at *1–2 (D. Or. 2018) 
(emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at *4 (“ORS 659A.885(7) limits who may bring suit: ‘Any individual against whom any 
distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 
national origin, marital status or age, if the individual is 18 years of age or older, has been made by 
any place of public accommodation, as defined in ORS 659A.400.’” (emphasis added) (citing ORS 
659A.885(7))). 
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whether Airbnb is a place of public accommodation under ORS 659.400(1).73 
The district court adopted the recommendations of the magistrate and 
granted Airbnb’s motion to dismiss on April 13, 2018.74  However, Harrington 
was given a fourteen-day period to file an amended complaint.75  Joined by 
two additional named plaintiffs, Carlotta Franklin and Ebony Price, 
Harrington filed a First Amended Class Action Allegation Complaint (FAC) 
on April 27, 2018.76 
Once again, Airbnb moved to dismiss the case, asserting plaintiffs failed 
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.) 
12(b)(6).77  This time, U.S. District Judge Michael H. Simon denied Airbnb’s 
motion to dismiss the FAC.78  He reviewed the FAC under the standard of 
facial plausibility, where the complaint must plead “factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged,” and held that Harrington and her co-plaintiffs met their 
burden of demonstrating that they were treated unequally because of their race 
and that they were injured as a result of unequal treatment under the Oregon 
Public Accommodations Act (OPAA).79 
In denying Airbnb’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the plaintiffs 
sufficiently pleaded that “Airbnb intentionally [made] many of the 
accommodations listed on its online platform unavailable to Plaintiffs and 
others on account of their race by maintaining policies that enable hosts to 
refuse service to prospective guests who are African-American.”80  They also 
adequately pleaded circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent by 
establishing that Airbnb possessed more than mere knowledge of the 
discriminatory effects of its policies.81  Given its knowledge of discriminatory 
behavior conducted via its platform, Airbnb “designed, imposed, and 
recommitted to features (specifically, its mandatory photograph policy) . . . in 
order not to lose the business of hosts who seek to discriminate on the basis 
 
 73. Id. at *5–6. 
 74. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-558-YY, 2018 WL 1778596, at *3 (D. Or. 2018). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00558-YY, 2018 WL 6133726, at *1 (D. Or. 2018). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1086–87 (D. Or. 2018). 
 79. Id. at 1089–91. 
 80. Id. at 1090. 
 81. Id. 
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of race or color.”82 
U.S. District Court Judge Michael H. Simon agreed with the plaintiffs 
that profile photographs did not reveal the kind of information Airbnb said 
they did, namely whether the guests were “reliable, authentic, and committed 
to the spirit of Airbnb.”83  However, they did reveal the race and color of the 
prospective guest.84  Accordingly, Ms. Harrington and her co-plaintiffs were 
able to allege that Airbnb’s justification for its photo policy was a pretext for 
discrimination.85 
Because plaintiffs adequately alleged intentional discrimination, the court 
moved on to decide the next issue: whether Airbnb is a place of public 
accommodation under the OPAA.86  Airbnb argued that it could not be 
considered a place of public accommodation under the OPAA because of the 
indirect nature of its relationship with guests.87  In addition, Airbnb argued 
that it is a “distinctly private” organization which excludes it from the 
statutory definition of a public accommodation.88  The court disagreed.89 
First, Judge Simon explained that Airbnb’s status as a private entity was 
a different question from whether hosts were private entities under the 
OPAA.90  He concluded that Airbnb’s membership requirement for hosts was 
by itself insufficient to qualify it as a private entity because “entities still may 
be open to the public ‘de facto’ when they are ‘so unselective in their 
membership criteria that they are effectively public.’”91 
Second, the court found that the OPAA covers both places and services 
that are offered to the public.92  Reviewing the OPAA’s definition under the 
broad standard intended by the Oregon Supreme Court, Judge Simon held that 
Airbnb offers a “service using its online platform to browse, locate, book, and 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1090–91. 
 84. Id. at 1090. 
 85. Id. at 1090–91 (explaining that the photograph requirement was discriminatory because it 
revealed the ethnicity of guests, not their character). 
 86. Id. at 1092. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1092–93 (quoting Lahmann v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 43 P.3d 1130, 
1135 (2002)). 
 92. Id. at 1093. 
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pay for accommodations in private homes.”93  In August 2019, the parties 
announced that they reached a settlement for an undisclosed amount.94  
Whereas Ms. Harrington’s case dealt with the prospect of future 
discrimination on Airbnb’s online platform, the next case concerns an incident 
of discrimination that had already occurred.95 
B. Selden v. Airbnb 
Plaintiff Gregory Selden, a young African American man, used Airbnb to 
book a room in Philadelphia in March of 2015.96  Finding a listing he liked, 
he tried to book it but was told by the host that it was unavailable.97  
Continuing his search, he once again came across the listing still open and 
available for booking.98  Suspicious, Selden created two fake accounts with 
the White-sounding names “Todd” and “Jessie.”99 
Selden applied for the listing under both fake accounts and both were 
accepted.100  When he confronted the host, the response was, “people like you 
always victimize yourselves solely on the basis of skin color.”101  Selden 
publicized the exchange on his Twitter account using the #airbnbwhileblack 
hashtag102 and received a number of similar stories from other users.103 
On May 17, 2016, Selden filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court 
 
 93. Id. at 1093.  “The Oregon Supreme Court has declared that the definition of a place of public 
accommodation under the OPAA ‘is intended to be a broad one and to apply to all types of businesses 
which offer goods and/or services to the public.’”  Id. (quoting Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am., 551 
P.2d 465, 469 (1976)). 
 94. Kiersten Willis, Black Oregon Women Score Undisclosed Settlement in Discrimination Suit 
Against Airbnb, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (Aug. 19, 2019), https://atlantablackstar.com/2019/ 
08/19/black-oregon-women-score-undisclosed-settlement-in-discrimination-suit-against-airbnb/. 
 95. Rachael Krishna, This Black Man Was Rejected by an Airbnb Host—Then Was Accepted 
Under a Fake White Profile, BUZZFEED NEWS, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/krishrach/this-
black-man-was-rejected-by-an-airbnb-host-then-was-accep (last updated May 6, 2016, 12:42 PM). 
 96. Russell Brandom, Airbnb’s Terms of Service Just Blocked a Racial Discrimination Case, THE 
VERGE (Nov. 1, 2016, 12:36 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/1/13487510/airbnb-terms-of-
service-racial-discrimination-arbitration. 
 97. Krishna, supra note 95. 
 98. Brandom, supra note 96. 
 99. Id.  One of the profiles shared similar characteristics with Selden, while the other was slightly 
older.  Krishna, supra note 95. 
 100. Krishna, supra note 95. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Brandom, supra note 96. 
 103. Id. 
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for the District of Columbia.104  The sole named plaintiff, Selden, alleged that 
Airbnb violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Fair Housing Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 3604.105  Airbnb moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration 
clause contained in the contract Selden agreed to when he signed up for the 
service.106  The issues presented before the court were (1) whether Selden had 
agreed to Airbnb’s Terms of Service; (2) if so, whether the mandatory 
arbitration clause applied to his claims of race discrimination; and (3) if the 
clause applied to his claims, whether it was enforceable.107 
On the first question, the court found that Selden agreed to Airbnb’s terms 
of service.108  It classified Airbnb’s Terms of Service Agreement as an online 
adhesion contract of the “sign-in-wrap” subtype.109  Citing the case of Berkson 
v. Gogo LLC, the court identified three instances in which district courts tend 
to uphold sign-in-wrap agreements, the first being if “the hyperlinked ‘terms 
and conditions’ is next to the only button that will allow the user to continue 
use of the website.”110  The court found that Airbnb’s sign-in-wrap agreement 
met this criterion because the sign-up box was placed “in roughly the middle 
of the page, in close proximity to all three sign-up buttons.”111  Furthermore, 
it was “clearly legible, appropriately sized, and unobscured by other visual 
elements.”112 
The court also took the opportunity to make the point that, given the 
ubiquity of online contracting for consumer services, “[a]ny reasonably-active 
adult consumer will almost certainly appreciate that by signing up for a 
particular service, he or she is accepting the terms and conditions of the 
 
 104. Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-cv-00933(CRC), 2016 WL 6476934 at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 
2016). 
 105. Id. (“Selden alleges that Airbnb violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000a, which prohibits race discrimination in public accommodations; the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits race discrimination in the formation of contracts; and the Fair 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, which prohibits race discrimination in the sale or rental of housing.”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at *4. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at *5 (quoting Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 401).  The other two conditions 
were 2) if “the user ‘signed up’ to the website and was presented with hyperlinks to the terms of use 
on subsequent visits;” and 3) if “notice of the hyperlinked terms and conditions is present on multiple 
successive webpages of the site.”  Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
[Vol. 48: 59, 2021] The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
 
75 
provider.”113  Therefore, Selden was aware that he was contracting with 
Airbnb and indicated his acceptance of the terms and conditions of the 
agreement when he clicked the sign-up box.114 
Next, the court considered whether the mandatory arbitration clause 
applied to Selden’s claims of racial discrimination.115  The clause read as 
follows: 
[The User] and Airbnb agree that any dispute, claim or controversy 
arising out of or relating to these Terms or the breach, termination, 
enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof, or to the use of the 
Services or use of the Site or Application (collectively, ‘Disputes’) 
will be settled by binding arbitration.116 
Applying California law,117 the court interpreted the language of the 
agreement broadly, following U.S. Supreme Court precedent which supports 
a broad reading.118  Accordingly the court found it “clear that Selden’s claims 
of unlawful racial discrimination ‘ar[ose] out of or relate[d] to’ his use of the 
Airbnb service.”119 
Lastly, the court addressed the enforceability of the arbitration clause in 
Selden’s case.120  It reviewed Selden’s two main arguments: “first, that federal 
civil rights claims are not subject to arbitration; and second, that the arbitration 
clause is unconscionable.”121 
The court disagreed with Selden’s argument that “the Congressional 
intent for ‘where and how’ [he] can bring his Title II suit is clearly 
codified.”122  While Title II states that “[t]he district courts of the United States 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id.  While “not directly under the first or second alternative sign-up buttons, any 
reasonably-observant user would notice the text and accompanying hyperlinks.”  Id. 
 115. Id. at *6. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at *6 n.3.  Since the court found that a valid agreement existed between Selden and 
Airbnb, it applied California law in accordance with the agreement’s choice of law terms.  Id. 
 118. Id. at *6 (mentioning the Supreme Court’s finding in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 624 (1985) that it was proper to interpret an arbitration 
agreement contract “broadly to cover matters that touch upon the contract to be arbitrable”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at *7. 
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shall have jurisdiction of proceedings initiated pursuant to this subchapter,”123 
the court held that this provision “neither guarantees a right to a federal court 
trial nor forbids arbitration as an alternate forum.”124  And, although the statute 
states that “[t]he remedies provided in this subchapter shall be the exclusive 
means of enforcing the rights based on this subchapter,” the court found that 
“[p]laintiffs may still vindicate their statutory rights in arbitration.”125 
Selden argued that arbitrations are not neutral because businesses, as 
“repeat-player[s]” in arbitration, have greater experience in choosing 
arbitrators who will lead to decisions in their favor.126  The court rejected this 
contention citing a lack of judicial support,127 and referring to Supreme Court 
precedent which “repeatedly rebuffed these arguments as insufficient to 
preclude arbitration.”128 
With respect to Selden’s contention that the agreement was an adhesion 
contract, and thus procedurally unconscionable, the court held that “adhesion 
contracts are not per se unconscionable under California law.”129  Secondly, 
the Terms of Service did not lack mutuality because they “clearly subject[ed] 
both parties to arbitration.”130  The court concluded that Selden’s argument 
that arbitration is too costly for the average consumer lacked merit, given that 
the arbitration fees would be paid by Airbnb.131  Therefore, the agreement was 
neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.132 
Granting Airbnb’s motion to compel arbitration, the court stayed the 
case.133  Unable to appeal during the stay, Selden moved to certify the order 
for an interlocutory appeal, asking the court to dismiss the case in the 
alternative.134  Selden’s motion was denied.135 
 
 123. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6). 
 124. Id. (citing Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 678 (5th Cir. 2006)). 
 125. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6).  “Any arbitration agreement that prevents them from doing 
so is invalid.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at *8. 
 128. Id. at *7 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 
(1985)). 
 129. Id. at *8. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at *9. 
 134. Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-cv-933(CRC), 2016 WL 7373776, at *1 (D.D.C Dec. 19, 2016). 
 135. Id. at *3.  The standard for certifying interlocutory appeals is demanding, and “even more 
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On the question of whether Selden’s civil rights claims were subject to 
arbitration, the court cited “clear authority” from the Supreme Court, “holding 
that arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA [Federal 
Arbitration Act] without contravening the policies of congressional 
enactments giving [individuals] specific protection against discrimination 
prohibited by federal law.”136 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed 
Selden’s appeal on February 2, 2017.137  It granted a motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction filed by Airbnb while holding that “[t]he district court’s 
order compelling arbitration and staying litigation pending arbitration is not 
appealable.”138  On October 2, 2017, the Supreme Court denied Selden’s “writ 
of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.”139 
C. Ramos v. Uber140 
In contrast with Selden, Ramos v. Uber Tech., Inc. presents an instance 
where the victim of discrimination was successful in challenging the validity 
 
stringent where the Court has compelled arbitration.”  Id. at *1.  Selden argued that “appellate guidance 
is needed on this issue because ‘the [C]ourt did not . . . cite to any authority from the D.C. Circuit with 
respect to the nature of electronic bargaining or online adhesion contracts.’”  Id.  However, “the Court 
did not cite authority from the D.C. Circuit on this issue because both parties agreed that California 
law governed the question of contract formation. . . .  [A]n electronic adhesion contract must be upheld 
under California law if its terms are clear and conspicuous.”  Id.  “[A]s far as the Court [was] aware,” 
the D.C. Circuit had not addressed the issue of “whether district courts must stay proceedings after all 
claims have been referred to arbitration and a stay has been requested, or whether they retain the 
discretion to dismiss such cases outright.”  Id. at *2 (quoting Goodrich v. Adtrav Travel Mgmt., 15-
cv-899, 2016 WL 4074082, at *4 n.3 (D.D.C. 2016)).  Nonetheless, the issuing of the stay 
“comport[ed] with recent practice in this district.”  Id.  It also conformed to the “FAA’s text, structure, 
and underlying policy” that “permit[ted] immediate appeal of orders hostile to arbitration . . . but 
bar[red] appeal of interlocutory orders favorable to arbitration.”  Id. (quoting Katz v. Cellco 
Partnership, 794 F.3d 341, 345 (2d. Cir. 2015) and Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 
531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000)). 
 136. Id. at *2. 
 137. Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., 681 F. App’x. 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 138. Id.  Selden failed to show “that the order is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), because 
it does not have the ‘practical effect’ of denying an injunction that ‘affects predominantly all of the 
merits’ or ‘might have a serious perhaps irreparable, consequence.”  Id.  He further failed to show that 
it was appealable “under a pendent jurisdiction theory . . . or the collateral order doctrine.”  Id. 
 139. Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 222 (Mem.) (2017). 
 140. 77 N.Y.S.3d 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).  
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of an arbitration clause in a suit against an online platform.141  On July 20, 
2016, plaintiff Elizabeth Ramos used the UberWAV app to try to hail an 
accessible vehicle from her home in Starrett City, Brooklyn.142  Ramos, then 
fifty-four years old, had been using “a wheelchair since she was 12 due to 
scoliosis.”143  She tried the app three times over the course of an hour but was 
never provided with a vehicle.144 
Ramos filed suit on July 29, 2016, alleging violations of New York 
Executive Law § 296 (2), the State  Human Rights Law.145  She additionally 
“assert[ed] a claim for violation of the Administrative Code of the City of 
New York § 8-107 (4) and the New York City Human Rights Law.”146  In 
response, Uber filed a motion to compel arbitration, supported by the 
affidavits of two employees.147 
With arbitration being a “favored method of dispute resolution in New 
York,” the issue of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate is to be 
decided by the courts.148  The agreement to arbitrate must be “clear, explicit 
and unequivocal, in order for the court to compel arbitration, and must not 
depend upon implication or subtlety.”149 
Uber argued that Ramos’s registration with Uber constituted a necessary 
acceptance of “Uber’s terms and conditions which included an agreement to 
arbitrate.”150 
Describing himself as a “Technical Lead Manager,” Chris Brauchli 
claimed that he “ha[d] access to Uber’s records regarding when and where 
riders create accounts.”151 
He attached three screenshots to his affidavit: 1) “CREATE AN 
 
 141. See id. at 302; see also Dan Rivoli, Uber Slammed in Lawsuit over Accessibility by Brooklyn 
Woman Who Uses Wheelchair, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2016, 8:08 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/disabled-brooklyn-woman-slams-uber-accessibilty-lawsuit-
article-1.2742076. 
 142. See Rivoli, supra note 141. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Ramos, 77 N.Y.S.3d at 297. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 298.  
 148. Id. (quoting Markowits v. Friedman, 144 A.D.3d 993, 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)). 
 149. Id. (citing Sutphin Retail One, LLC v. Sutphin Airtrain Realty, LLC, 143 A.D.3d 972, 973 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016)). 
 150. Id. at 299. 
 151. Id. 
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ACCOUNT,” which displays the first step in the registration process; 2) 
“CREATE A PROFILE,” where the registrant would enter their first and last 
name; and 3) “ADD PAYMENT,” where the registrant would enter their 
payment information.152  Despite claiming that Ramos registered for Uber on 
November 4, 2015, Brauchli failed to “annex a copy of the screenshot of the 
‘Terms & Conditions’ that would have appeared had Ramos clicked the 
phrase ‘Terms & Conditions and Privacy Policy’ displayed in the rectangular 
box” in the “ADD PAYMENT” screenshot.153 
The court disagreed “with Brauchli’s contention that the framing of the 
phrase ‘Terms & Conditions and Privacy Policy’ within [the] rectangular box 
[gave] reasonable notice to anyone that it [was] a clickable button.”154  The 
“ADD PAYMENT” screen’s language was ambiguous “on its face.”155  A 
registrant could reasonably believe that the Terms and Conditions pertained 
to using a “facebook [(sic)] account or email and mobile number for sending 
bills and receipts.”156  Moreover, the instructions on the “ADD PAYMENT” 
screen did not contain “any indication advising the applicant that clicking on 
the words  ‘Terms & Conditions and Privacy Policy’ will take the applicant 
to another screen purportedly containing Uber’s terms and conditions.”157 
The court ultimately held that Ramos did not “clearly, explicitly and 
unequivocally” agree to arbitration when she signed up for Uber.158  “Uber’s 
motion improperly depend[ed] upon implication or subtlety in the 
interpretation of its ambiguous registration process.”159  It denied Uber’s 
motion to compel arbitration and compelled the company to interpose an 
answer within thirty days of the order.160 
As of this writing, Harrington, Selden, and Ramos are the only consumer 
discrimination cases brought against sharing economy platforms in which 
judges have rendered decisions.  The mixed outcomes of these cases do not 
yet reveal whether the current laws will serve as adequate tools to protect 
victims of consumer discrimination in the platform economy.  In fact, it is 
 
 152. Id. at 300. 
 153. Id. at 301. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 302. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. 
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unclear whether the current laws—either state or federal—sufficiently address 
the issue of consumer equality.  Our focus next turns to whether the extant 
laws are successful in removing obstacles to full participation for all in the 
marketplace. 
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL VS. STATE LAWS IN PROVIDING RELIEF 
FOR CONSUMER DISCRIMINATION 
In this part, we assess the effectiveness of federal and state laws by 
reviewing the statutes’ language and comparing the decisions in which courts 
have interpreted them.  Plaintiffs generally rely on two federal laws when 
seeking redress for consumer discrimination: Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
A. Public Accommodations Statutes 
Title II is the federal public accommodations law.161  Forty-five states 
have their own version of public accommodation laws covering nondisabled 
individuals.162  Only Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and 
Texas do not have state public accommodation laws covering nondisabled 
individuals.163  All of the state laws cover discrimination on the basis of race, 
as well as sex, ancestry/national origin, and religion/creed.164 
1. Federal Public Accommodations Law 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “[a]ll persons shall 
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964). 
 162. State Public Accommodation Laws, NCSL (Apr. 4, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-
and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  Some states’ statutes provide protection for individuals based on their membership in other 
categories such as: “marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual 
orientation . . . pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, gender identity or expression, disability[,] . . . [and] 
liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 
2020).  California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act also protects against discrimination based on medical 
condition, genetic information, primary language, and immigration status.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 
2016).  The District of Columbia’s public accommodations law covers individuals based on personal 
appearance, family responsibilities, “matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, or place of 
residence or business.”  D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.31(a) (West 2001). 
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privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or 
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”165 
To qualify as a place of public accommodation under the Act, an 
establishment’s operations must affect interstate commerce.166  The 
establishment must also be among those enumerated in the statute, which 
includes inns, restaurants, and theaters, as well as “any establishment . . . 
physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered 
by this subsection.”167 
Federal courts have construed this statute narrowly to exclude any type of 
establishment not included on the list.  For example, in McCrea v. Saks, 
Inc.,168 the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held 
that retail establishments were not covered by Title II.169  The plaintiff, 
Theresa McCrea, was shopping at defendant’s retail store when she got into 
an argument with a salesman who complained about her young daughter 
running through store aisles.170  The salesman called security, ordering them 
to “get this ‘n-----’ out.”171  The court reasoned that the statute’s explicit 
reference to “cafeterias, lunchrooms, lunch counters, and any facility ‘located 
on the premises of any retail establishment’”  clearly evinced Congress’ intent 
to exclude retail establishments from its ambit.172  Had Congress not intended 
as such, there would have been no need for such a provision.173 
Similarly, in Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim that they were 
denied service by a hair salon in violation of Title II.174  The court 
acknowledged that, “[t]here [could] be no doubt that plaintiffs have presented 
not only strong but direct evidence of the salon’s intent to discriminate.”175  
Indeed, the plaintiffs were expressly told that “the salon did not ‘do black 
 
 165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964). 
 166. Id. at § 2000a(b). 
 167. Id. at §§ 2000(b)(1–4). 
 168. No. CIV. A. 00-CV-1936, 2000 WL 1912726 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2000). 
 169. Id. at *2. 
 170. Id. at *1. 
 171. Id.  McCrea and her family ultimately left without making their intended purchase.  Id. 
 172. Id. at *2 (quoting § 2000a(b)(2)). 
 173. Id. 
 174. 456 F.3d 427, 429 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 175. Id. at 434. 
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people’s hair.’”176  Nonetheless, the court held that salons were not covered 
under Title II because they were not explicitly “mentioned in any of the 
numerous definitions of  ‘place of public accommodation.’”177  The court 
disagreed with the plaintiffs’ characterization of the salon as a “place of 
exhibition or entertainment” because the functions of a salon are not akin to 
those of an entertainment venue such as a theater or symphony.178  The 
specificity used by Congress in delineating certain types of entertainment 
venues ruled out any establishments that could have any tangential 
entertainment value.179  Furthermore, establishments such as salons are so 
common as to preclude any omission of their inclusion in the statute as mere 
oversight.180 
Beyond the fairly narrow scope of the statute’s coverage, the 
effectiveness of Title II is limited in part because it provides only for 
injunctive relief to the exclusion of monetary damages.181  Therefore, a second 
threshold issue for Title II plaintiffs is whether they have standing to pursue a 
claim for injunctive relief.182  A plaintiff must demonstrate a “real and 
immediate threat of repeated injury,”183 by “[setting] forth the likelihood of a 
future encounter with the defendant which is likely to lead to a similar 
violation of some protected right.”184  The “real and immediate threat” 
requirement enables defendants to defeat racial discrimination claims based 
on one-off encounters. 
In Macer v. Bertucci’s Corp., the improbability of future injury was used 
to defeat plaintiff’s claim in which she alleged discrimination at a Bertucci’s 
restaurant.185  According to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York, plaintiff’s complaint “include[d] no allegations that defendant 
 
 176. Id. at 435.  Allegedly, the salon’s manager explained that “each and every one of the eight or 
nine hair stylists present refused to work on [plaintiff] Jean Denny’s hair.”  Id.  
 177. Id. at 431. 
 178. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (1964)). 
 179. Id. at 434. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Macer v. Bertucci’s Corp., No. 13-CV-2994(JFB)(ARL), 2013 WL 6235607, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 3, 2013). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (quoting Henry v. Lucky Strike Entertainment, LLC, No. 10-CV-03682(RRM)(MDG), 
2013 WL 4710488, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2013)). 
 184. Id. (quoting Joseph v. N.Y. Yankees P’Ship, No. 00 Civ. 2275(SHS), 2000 WL 1559019, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2000)). 
 185. Id. at *7. 
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discriminated against plaintiff since the events in question, much less 
allegations that such discrimination likely will occur in the future.”186  The 
court had already struck down the Title II claim because plaintiff only sought 
monetary damages, but even if she had sought the injunctive relief allowed by 
the statute, the lack of evidence that future harm was “real and imminent” 
would still ultimately defeat her claim.187 
Furthermore, the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint did not establish a 
plausible claim under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000a (Title II), according to the court.188  To establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, a plaintiff must plead facts showing that he or she: 
(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) attempted to exercise the 
right to full benefits and enjoyment of a place of public 
accommodation; (3) was denied those benefits and enjoyment; and 
(4) was treated less favorably than similarly situated persons who are 
not members of the protected class.189 
The third and fourth prongs of the test have proven particularly 
troublesome to plaintiffs with consumer discrimination claims.  Acey v. Bob 
Evans Farms, Inc. provides an example.190  Visiting a restaurant with his 
daughter, plaintiff Joel Acey asked a waitress to be seated near the front of the 
restaurant, “which was not busy and where space was available.”191  Rather 
than oblige his request, the waitress took Acey to the back of the restaurant 
where she slammed the menus on the table, calling Acey a “damned idiot.”192 
The court rejected Acey’s Title II claim based on the third and fourth 
prongs of the prima facie test.193  Despite the hostile treatment, Acey failed to 
satisfy the third prong as he did not demonstrate that he was denied the full 
enjoyment or benefits of a place of public accommodation.194  As to the fourth 
prong, the court noted that his complaint was “devoid of any allegations” that 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at *8. 
 189. Taylor v. Ahold, No. 3:16cv241, 2017 WL 377935, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2017). 
 190. No. 2:13-cv-04916, 2014 WL 989201, at *4 (S.D.W.Va. Mar. 13, 2014). 
 191. Id. at *1. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at *9. 
 194. Id. 
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non-members of a protected class were treated more favorably.195 
Recognizing the difficulty of having to identify different treatment of 
similarly situated people outside of one’s protected class, some courts have 
applied an altered version of the fourth prong.196  Typically used in cases 
involving restaurants where plaintiffs often have difficulty demonstrating 
disparate treatment, the modified test asks whether “(a) the services were 
made available to similarly situated persons outside the plaintiff’s protected 
class or (b) the plaintiff ‘received services in a markedly hostile manner and 
in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively 
discriminatory.’”197 
Even the modified standard of the fourth prong presents difficulty for 
plaintiffs.  For example, in Hynes v. Brasil, plaintiff brought suit following an 
argument with a restaurant manager who asked him to move to a smaller 
table.198  During the encounter, the manager explained that he wished to make 
the larger tables available for the lunch rush.199  Hynes pointed out a woman 
sitting by herself at a large table, but the manager told him that she had been 
with a party of four that had ordered food.200  Therefore, the court concluded 
that “Hynes does not point to or submit any evidence showing that other 
similarly situated persons . . . outside his protected class were treated more 
favorably.”201 
The manager repeatedly invited Hynes to order, but Hynes just replied, 
“possibly coffee.”202  The manager responded that he “did not ‘appreciate that 
kind of business here.’”203  Analyzing Hynes’ claim under the modified test, 
the court held that the manager’s actions did not meet the “markedly hostile” 
standard because invitations to order and explanations for asking a patron to 
move to a smaller table did not qualify as hostile.204  While the manager’s 
behavior may have eventually risen to such a level, it still did not qualify as it 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Hynes v. Brasil LLC, No. H-17-2419, 2018 WL 1726157, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2018) 
(citing Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs. Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 350, n.2 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at *4. 
 202. Id. at *1. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at *4. 
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did not occur until after Hynes had become hostile himself.205 
2. State Public Accommodations Laws 
The state public accommodations laws vary in their specificity in terms 
of enumerating what they define as places of public accommodations.  Many 
provide exhaustive lists,206 while others offer little more than generalized 
statements.207  The state of Wyoming provides a very broad definition of what 
constitutes a place of public accommodation, with its statute simply referring 
to places that are “public in nature, or which invite the patronage of the 
public.”208 
Transportation providers are mentioned frequently in lists of covered 
entities.  Alaska’s and Montana’s statutes each refer to “transportation 
companies.”209  The statutes of Hawaii and Michigan specify transportation 
facilities “of any kind.”210  Massachusetts mentions “carrier[s]” for 
transportation as well as any facilities belonging to them.211 
Lodging facilities are included in the statutes, often listed in the form of 
hotels, inns, and motels.212  Some states employ a broader definition,213 while 
allowing certain lodgings to be exempted from non-discrimination statutes.214  
Under most state laws (as well as federal law), an establishment qualifies for 
the “Mrs. Murphy exemption” if it is located within a building “which 
contains not more than five (5) rooms for rent and which is actually occupied 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.300 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 
(West 2014); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02 (West 2020). 
 207. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46A-63 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5902 (West 
2005); IND. CODE ANN. 22-9-1-3 (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2 (West 2019). 
 208. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-101 (West 2020); see also NCSL, supra note 162 (listing no 
definitional statute for public accommodations in Wyoming). 
 209. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.300 (West 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101 (West 2015). 
 210. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 489-2 (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 37.2301 (West 2000). 
 211. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 2016). 
 212. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.300 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502 (West 
2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.010 (West 2017). 
 213. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2014) (“‘[P]lace of public 
accommodation’ means . . .  any place to eat, drink, sleep,  or rest.”) (emphasis added); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 489-2 (West 2019). 
 214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (1964); see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102 (West 2017); 775 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-101 (West 2018). 
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by the proprietor of such establishment as a residence.”215 
State courts tend to interpret their own public accommodations laws 
broadly.  For example, in King v. Greyhound Lines,216 the reviewing court 
held that the plaintiff was the victim of discrimination under Oregon’s state 
public accommodations law despite not being refused service.217  In King, the 
plaintiff brought suit after being subjected to racial epithets while trying to 
refund a one-way bus ticket.218  The defendant alleged that racial slurs were 
not actionable under the act, and the trial court agreed.219 
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision.220  It 
interpreted the state statute broadly, stating that the prohibition against 
“distinction, discrimination, or restriction” on the basis of race encompasses 
more than an outright denial of service.221  Despite the lack of legislative 
history and case law on the issue, the court noted the general intent behind the 
legislation to prevent “operators and owners of businesses catering to the 
general public from subjecting Negroes to oppression and humiliation.”222 
A few courts have considered whether an online business qualifies as a 
place of public accommodation.  Recently, California’s Supreme Court held 
that the state’s public accommodation law “applies to online businesses and 
that visiting a website with intent to use its services is, for purposes of 
standing, equivalent to presenting oneself for services at a brick-and-mortar 
store.”223  On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit agreed with the lower court that a place of public accommodation must 
be a physical location.224 
 
 215. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7)(A). 
 216. 656 P.2d 349 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). 
 217. Id. at 352. 
 218. Id. at 350. 
 219. Id. at 352.  The trial court entered judgment for the defendant while sitting without a jury.  Id. 
 220. Id. at 352. 
 221. Id. at 351. 
 222. Id. at 352. 
 223. White v. Square, Inc., 446 P.3d 276, 277–78 (Cal. 2019).  Plaintiff sued the online platform 
alleging that he was prevented from using its services on the basis of his occupation.  Id. at 278.  Like 
the high court in California, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Court of Appeals of 
New York have held that places of public accommodation do not require a physical structure to qualify 
as a place of public accommodation.  See Currier v. Nat’l. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 965 N.E.2d 829, 
842–43 (Mass. 2012); see also U.S. Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d 
1199, 1203 (N.Y. 1983).  A federal district court in New York has held that a website is a place of 
public accommodation.  Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, 268 F.Supp.3d 381, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 224. Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 816 Fed. App’x. 497, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  Similarly, 
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Another important point in interpreting state public accommodation laws 
lies in deciding who is protected from discriminatory acts by providers.225  
Jackson v. Superior Court featured a plaintiff who brought a claim for 
discrimination after a bank teller prevented him from giving investment 
advice to two bank customers.226  Jackson was not himself a customer of the 
bank.227  Ruling in Jackson’s favor, the California Court of Appeal looked 
beyond the statutory language and determined that the legislative intent 
behind the law was to cover more than just “selling, buying or trading.”228  In 
accompanying customers to assist them with their banking business, Jackson 
was engaging in a protected act under the statute, the denial of which 
prevented him from experiencing the “‘full and equal accommodations, 
advantages, privileges or services’ of the bank.”229 
Another California Court of Appeal case, Payne v. Anaheim Memorial 
Medical Center, Inc., is instructive on the matter of who is protected under 
the state’s public accommodations law.230  Plaintiff, Dr. David Payne, alleged 
racial discrimination against a hospital after suffering adverse treatment by 
colleagues that hindered his treatment of a patient.231  The hospital argued that 
it was exempt from the civil rights law as Dr. Payne was not an employee.232  
 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that “a ‘location’ in cyberspace, 
such as NABI’s website, is not a ‘place’ of public accommodation” under the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination (NJLAD).  Demetro v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bunco Investigations, Civ. No. 14-
6521(KM)(SCM), 2019 WL 2612687, at *15 (D.N.J. June 25, 2019).  The court’s holding rests on its 
characterization of NABI as an organization that restricts its membership.  See id.  Therefore, 
it seems likely that if the court was considering a different type of website, like an online 
retailer of consumer goods or services, it might more readily see similarities with the 
NJLAD’s enumerated examples such as “any . . . retail shop, store, establishment or 
concession dealing with goods and services of any kind.” 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5.  David Brody & Sean Bickford, Discriminatory Denial of Service: Applying 
State Public Accommodations Laws to Online Commerce, LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
UNDER LAW 1, 24 (2020), https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Online-Public-
Accommodations-Report.pdf. 
 225. See, e.g., Jackson v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see also 
James M. Gottry, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Laws Take Aim at First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961, 967–68 (2019). 
 226. Jackson, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207–08. 
 227. See id. 
 228. Id. at 209. 
 229. See id.   
 230. 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 231. Id. at 232–33. 
 232. Id. at 244. 
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Instead, the hospital said Dr. Payne’s access to the hospital’s facilities arose 
out of his membership in what could have been considered “an elite club” 
because the facilities were not offered to the entire public.233  The hospital 
argued that Dr. Payne’s access was contingent upon his “elite” status as a 
physician.234  Ruling for Dr. Payne, the court held that the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act (UCRA) “is not restricted to those businesses or public facilities which 
offer their wares or services to everyone.”235  Given the qualifications 
necessary to become one, it was reasonable for the hospital to restrict staff 
privileges only to physicians.236  However, it could not go a step further and 
restrict the group to members of a certain race.237 
Wayne v. MasterShield, Inc. features a contrasting view to that in the 
Payne case on the issue of the relationships between discrimination victims 
and providers.238  Samuel Sando Wayne brought suit under the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act (MHRA) after he was detained and harassed by security 
staff at Parkview, a residential apartment complex where he was staying as a 
guest.239  Like the hospital in Payne, Parkview was selective with respect to 
its tenants and guests.240  The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the 
restriction to members of the general public, along with a limited tenant 
capacity and requirement that tenants “sponsor” their visitors, qualified it as a 
private facility and not a place of public accommodation.241 
In interpreting the MHRA, the court gave “strong weight” to federal 
precedent because of “substantial similarities” between it and Title II.242  The 
court took a narrow view, noting that Title II limited its definition of 
accommodations to an “establishment which provides lodging to transient 
guests” and that apartment complexes provide “private non-transient 
dwellings.”243  Therefore, the court found that Mr. Wayne’s public 
accommodations claim was rightfully dismissed on summary judgment.244 
 
 233. Id. at 244–45. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 245. 
 236. See id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. 597 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 239. Id. at 919. 
 240. Id. at 921. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 921–22. 
 244. Id. at 922. 
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The state court made a similar distinction in Parsons v. Henry, an Oregon 
case, to exclude a private construction contractor from the definition of place 
of public accommodation based on his performance of services only after a 
bid process and negotiation.245 
State laws did not fare any better or worse in federal courts than they did 
in their respective states, meeting the same fate as their federal counterparts.  
When federal claims were either absent or evaluated independently of the state 
claims, federal courts tended to defer to the state courts.246  In Harrington v. 
Airbnb, Inc., for example, the federal district court noted the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s broad interpretation of the Oregon Public Accommodations Act in 
holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Airbnb was a place of public 
accommodation within the meaning of the statute.247  Where the state court 
interprets the public accommodations statute broadly, federal courts are likely 
to adopt a similar interpretation.248 
In Craig v. US Bancorp, the plaintiff alleged discrimination after 
withstanding over an hour’s worth of delays in trying to cash a check.249  The 
defendant stated that the delays were due to a “‘fraud’ investigation” on the 
account at issue, but two White test customers were able to cash checks on the 
account without any problem.250  Examining Oregon’s public accommodation 
statute, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon noted the 
state appellate court’s interpretation that the “chief harm” of discrimination 
was the “greater evil of unequal treatment.”251  Applying this interpretation, 
the district court held that “the issue [was] not whether racial invective was 
used,” but whether Craig suffered unequal treatment on account of his race.252  
In this case, the court found that Craig suffered unequal treatment when he 
faced the delay in service that caused him emotional harm.253 
 
 245. 672 P.2d 717, 721 (Or. Ct. App. 1983). 
 246. See, e.g., Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1093 (D. Or. 2018); Craig v. US 
Bancorp, No. Civ. 03-1680-AA, 2004 WL 817149, at *2, *4 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 2004). 
 247. Harrington, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 1093. 
 248. See id. 
 249. Craig, 2004 WL 817149, at *1. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at *4 (quoting King v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 656 P.2d 349, 352 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
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B. Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ensures the right of “[a]ll 
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to make and enforce 
contracts.”254  The statute defines making and enforcing contracts as including 
“the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the 
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual 
relationship.”255  It has been employed by plaintiffs claiming discrimination 
in consumer transactions, although it is relied upon primarily in cases of 
employment discrimination.256 
Because it neither limits the types of establishments covered under the 
statute nor does it restrict plaintiffs from seeking damages, § 1981 is a more 
effective tool for consumer discrimination plaintiffs.257  The courts have 
adopted the burden-shifting framework for plaintiffs suing under § 1981.258  
The framework was first adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, an employment-discrimination case, to guide the 
analysis for claims relying on circumstantial evidence.259  The test was 
adapted to the consumer setting by the court in Callwood v. Dave & Busters, 
Inc.260  Under the Callwood test, to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: 
1) they are members of a protected class; (2) they made themselves 
available to receive and pay for services ordinarily provided by the 
defendant to all members of the public in the manner in which they 
are ordinarily provided; and (3) they did not enjoy the privileges and 
benefits of the contracted for experience under factual circumstances 
which rationally support an inference of unlawful discrimination in 
that (a) they are deprived of services while similarly situated persons 
 
 254. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West). 
 255. Id. 
 256. See Delaney M. Busch, Supreme Court Clarifies Race Discrimination Claims Under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 Must Meet More Stringent “But-For” Causation Standard, MINTZ (Apr. 17, 2020) 
https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2226/2020-04-17-supreme-court-clarifies-race-
discrimination-claims-under. 
 257. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West).  See Abby Morrow Richardson, Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to 
Claims of Consumer Discrimination, 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 119, 121 (2005). 
 258. See, e.g., Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 259. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 260. 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 707 (D. Md. 2000). 
[Vol. 48: 59, 2021] The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
 
91 
outside the protected class were not deprived of those services, and/or 
(b) they received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a 
manner which a reasonable person would find objectively 
unreasonable.261 
A plaintiff must attempt to show that she made herself available to receive 
and pay for services.262  But at what point does the contractual relationship 
begin?  Courts that have considered this question have determined that a 
customer’s mere presence in a business establishment is insufficient to allege 
that a contractual relationship exists between the customer and the business.263  
A “tangible attempt to contract” must be made.264  In Henderson v. Office 
Depot, Inc., for example, the District Court for the Western District of 
Louisiana held that a contractual relationship began the moment a customer 
attempted to negotiate the terms of a prospective transaction.265  Henderson’s 
claim for discrimination arose when the defendant store’s employees failed to 
assist the plaintiff in purchasing a printer.266  The court cited a broad standard 
put forth by the U.S. Supreme Court “expressly stat[ing] that § 1981 reaches 
‘all phases and incidents of the contractual relationship.’”267 
Newman v. Borders, Inc. involved a plaintiff who was visiting a Borders 
bookstore intending to purchase a children’s book for his nephew.268  As he 
proceeded to the register, he was confronted by a security officer and accused 
of putting items in a shopping bag (from another store) that he was carrying.269  
After emptying the bag and proving he had not stolen from the store, Newman 
was denied the opportunity to view security camera footage that allegedly 
showed him putting items in the bag and ultimately left the store without 
making a purchase.270  According to the court, because he was attempting to 
make a transaction by purchasing a book, it was sufficient that Newman 
alleged he was “thwarted in his attempt to make a purchase and close a 
 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Newman v. Borders, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 346, 349 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 264. Id. 
 265. CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2907, 2016 WL 6653029, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 19, 2016). 
 266. Id. at *1. 
 267. Id. at *3 (citing Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1994)). 
 268. Newman, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 347. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 348. 
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Despite the broad Rivers standard, the protections given to “all phases” 
of the contractual relationship do not necessarily extend beyond the 
completion of the transaction itself.272  Range v. Wal-Mart Supercenter is one 
example where the plaintiffs presented “adequate” evidence from which to 
infer discrimination based on race.273  The incident in Range stemmed from 
security personnel demanding that plaintiffs show a receipt after making their 
purchase.274  Because the discriminatory action took place after the purchase, 
the district court held that “the alleged discrimination was not part of the 
‘contract’ or sale, and [could not] be the basis for liability under § 1981.”275 
Similarly, in Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., after making a 
purchase, Carl Youngblood was confronted by a store security officer.276  
Youngblood’s argument focused on this distinction: the officer took the 
purchased items and did not return them to him; therefore, the transaction had 
not ended.277  The appeals court held that the distinction was of “little 
significance.”278  The “key” question was whether a contractual duty remained 
when Youngblood was confronted by security.279  The court answered in the 
negative, holding that the transaction ended once Youngblood paid and 
received the beef jerky he purchased.280  “[N]either party owed the other any 
duty under the retail-sale contract.”281 
Plaintiffs bringing claims under § 1981 must demonstrate more than a 
“possible loss of . . . contracting opportunities.”282  The possible loss of future 
opportunities is insufficient.283  In Hynes, the alleged discriminatory treatment 
by Fergus, in the eyes of the court, “did not interfere with Hynes’ patronage 
 
 271. Id. at 349. 
 272. See, e.g., Range v. Wal-Mart Supercenter, No. 3:08 CV 09, 2008 WL 1701870, at *4 (N.D. 
Ind. Apr. 8, 2008); see also note 267 and accompanying text (citing to Rivers). 
 273. Range, 2008 WL 1701870, at *4. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. 266 F.3d 851, 853 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 277. Id. at 854. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. McCrea v. Saks, Inc., No. CIV. A. 00-CV-1936, 2000 WL 1912726, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 
2000). 
 283. Id. 
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of the restaurant.”284  Although the hostile treatment was the cause of Hynes’ 
decision to leave the cafe, it did not per se interfere with his ability to make a 
transaction protected by § 1981.285 
Likewise, in McCrea v. Saks, Inc., the plaintiff and her daughter left the 
defendant’s retail store after their confrontation with the store’s security 
personnel.286  As previously mentioned, they did so after a salesman asked 
security to “get this ‘n-----’ out.”287  In dismissing McCrea’s complaint, the 
district court did not credit her contention that the defendant knew she wanted 
to purchase a shirt and concluded that she failed to demonstrate that she would 
have tried to purchase merchandise had she not been harassed by the 
defendant.288 
Prong 3(a) parallels the “similarly situated” test previously discussed 
relative to the Title II analysis.289  It is based on “the understanding that ‘the 
comparison will never involve precisely the same set of . . . [conduct] 
occurring over the same period of time and under the same sets of 
circumstances.’”290 
In cases involving adequate comparative evidence, courts may choose not 
to follow the Callwood test; as was the case in Williams v. Staples Inc.291  The 
plaintiff in Williams suspected he was discriminated against when he was not 
able to cash an out-of-state check at a Staples store, but his friend, a White 
woman, told him that her out-of-state check was accepted during a prior 
visit.292  Two testers, one White and one Black, were sent by a civil rights 
agency to the store.293  The White tester’s out-of-state check was accepted for 
payment while the Black tester’s check was not.294  The court concluded that 
the results of the tests, as well as the experiences of the plaintiff and his friend, 
were sufficient evidence to allow the plaintiff to state a prima facie case of 
 
 284. Hynes v. Brasil LLC, Civil Action No. H-17-2419, 2018 WL 1726157, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 
10, 2018). 
 285. See id. 
 286. McCrea, 2000 WL 1912726, at *1. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at *3. 
 289. See supra text accompanying note 197. 
 290. Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Callwood v. 
Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 707 (D. Md. 2000)). 
 291. 372 F.3d 662, 668 n.5 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 292. Id. at 665–66. 
 293. Id. at 666. 
 294. Id. 
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Prong 3(b) of the Callwood test serves as an alternative to 3(a), 
“account[ing] for situations in the commercial establishment context in which 
a plaintiff cannot [readily] identify other similarly situated persons.”296  The 
“markedly hostile” prong allows a fact finder to infer “‘discrimination 
sufficient to support a prima facie case’ without” the plaintiff having to prove 
differential treatment of similarly situated individuals.297  Factors used in the 
determination of markedly hostile conduct include behavior that “is (1) so 
profoundly contrary to the manifest financial interests of the merchant and/or 
her employees; (2) so far outside of widely-accepted business norms; and (3) 
so arbitrary on its face, that the conduct supports a rational inference of 
discrimination.”298 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the test and found that 
Wal-Mart engaged in “markedly hostile” behavior toward Ms. Christian.299  
The plaintiff was an African American woman shopping with her White friend 
at Wal-Mart.300  She was excessively offered assistance by an employee before 
being accused of shoplifting and having the police called on her.301  
Considering the evidence that plaintiff and her friend were the only two 
shoppers in the department, and that only plaintiff was using a shopping 
cart,302 the court held that Christian “raised a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether she received services in a markedly hostile manner.”303 
Bonner v. S-Fer International, Inc. is another case in which there was 
“scant” evidence of differential treatment between a plaintiff and members of 
a non-protected class.304  Examining clothes at defendant’s boutique, plaintiff 
Tasha Bonner was treated rudely by employees before being told to leave.305  
 
 295. Id. at 668 n.5. 
 296. Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Callwood v. 
Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 708 (D. Md. 2000)). 
 297. See id. 
 298. Id. (quoting Callwood, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 708). 
 299. See id. at 872, 879. 
 300. Id. at 864–65. 
 301. Id. at 865. 
 302. Id. at 878 (“The only factual difference between these two shoppers, i.e., that Christian had a 
shopping cart, reinforces the inference of discrimination, because a customer with a cart presumably 
appears more serious about shopping than a patron who walks around without a cart.”). 
 303. Id. 
 304. 207 F. Supp. 3d 19, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 305. Id. at 22. 
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She was given conflicting explanations for the demand to leave the store, first 
being told she lacked a membership to shop there, but then later being told it 
was because of her “attitude.”306  An employee called the police while another 
locked the door, leaving Bonner “‘trapped’ in the store for ‘several minutes’ 
before she was permitted to leave.”307 
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia noted that 
plaintiffs in retail discrimination cases “often arise from limited, one-off 
interactions with service-industry establishments.”308  Bonner may have been 
the only customer in the store at the time of her encounter.309  Not being able 
to compare herself to White customers “should not require dismissing a claim 
that otherwise rests on facts supporting a plausible inference of racial 
discrimination.”310  Therefore, the court concluded that the store personnel’s 
behavior could be viewed as “markedly hostile” and denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim.311 
The treatment of § 1981 claims has varied among states.312  In Turner v. 
Wong, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, employed a 
broad construction of § 1981.313  Comparing it to New Jersey’s public 
accommodations law, the court deemed § 1981 to be “similarly expansive,” 
reaching “purely private” discriminatory acts.314  The court also held § 1981 
to cover discrimination occurring “both during and after the formation of a 
contract.”315  This was a crucial holding for the plaintiff, Delois Turner, as she 
experienced discrimination during and after her purchase of a donut and 
coffee from defendant’s store.316  When Turner complained about her donut 
 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 25. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See Kendall Coffey, Civil Rights 42 U.S.C. 1981: Keeping a Compromised Promise of Equality 
to Blacks, 29 U. Fla. L. Rev. 318, 325–26 (1977) (laying out the varying treatments of the statute and 
explaining how the lower courts and the Supreme Court deal with the vague nature of the statute); see 
also Jeremy D. Bayless & Sophie F. Wang, Racism on Aisle Two: A Survey of Federal and State Anti-
Discrimination Public Accommodation Laws, 2 Wm. & Mary Pol’y Rev. 288, 230 (2011) (finding that 
the outcome of a case will vary depending on which state the action is brought in, as evidenced by 
differing state public accommodation statutes). 
 313. 832 A.2d. 240, 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 345–46. 
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being stale and asked for a new one, the defendant uttered racial epithets and 
ordered her to leave the store.317  Because she was not able to complete her 
original transaction, the court allowed the plaintiff to overcome the summary 
judgment that was entered against her at the trial level.318 
In contrast, the court in Lopez v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc. granted the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff was able to complete his 
purchases after an African American cashier refused to help him and diverted 
him to a different cashier based on his race.319  Although the appellate court 
affirmed the district court’s decision, it did not address whether § 1981 applies 
after the formation of a contract.320  Instead, it highlighted Lopez’s failure to 
present evidence of discriminatory intent. 
The analysis used by courts in evaluating state public accommodations 
claims was identical to the methods used for § 1981 claims, tying their fate 
together.321  The results of the assessment conducted in this part suggest that 
state public accommodations laws and § 1981 are more effective than Title II 
in providing relief for victims of consumer discrimination.  In Part III, we 
deepen our analysis by tracking the outcomes of cases in which courts ruled 
on defendants’ motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. 
III. PLAINTIFF SUCCESS RATES IN SURVIVING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Our research uncovered only eight cases in which consumers alleging 
discrimination based on race have advanced to the trial stage.322  All of them 
involved § 1981 claims.  As shown in Figure 1, three trials resulted in findings 
for the plaintiffs, one of which was reversed on appeal.323  All of the trials that 
 
 317. Id. at 346. 
 318. Id. at 355–56, 359–60. 
 319. No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0104, 2014 WL 354252, *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014). 
 320. Id. at *1, *3. 
 321. See, e.g., Bonner v. S-Fer Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 19, 24 (D.D.C. 2016); Drayton v. Toys 
“R” Us Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 149, 157–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 322. See infra fig.1. 
 323. Wong v. Mangone, 450 F. App’x 27 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 813 (2012) (jury 
verdict for plaintiff affirmed on appeal); Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(bench trial verdict for plaintiff reversed on appeal for defendant); Hampton v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 
Inc., 247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2001) (jury verdict for plaintiff; defendant’s judgment as a matter of 
law was denied by trial court and the denial was affirmed on appeal). 
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resulted in victories for the defendants were affirmed on appeal.324 
 
FIGURE 1 | FEDERAL APPEALS COURT DECISIONS REVIEWING JURY AND 




Indeed, most cases end long before a trial takes place.325  In this Part, we 
analyze state and federal court decisions to determine whether plaintiffs are 
more successful at defeating defendants’ motions to dismiss or motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 324. Aboeid v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 566 F. App’x 34 (2d Cir. 2014) (bench trial verdict 
for defendant affirmed on appeal); Bary v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 553 F. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2014) (bench 
trial verdict for defendant affirmed on appeal); Odunukwe v. Bank of Am., 335 F. App’x 58 (1st Cir. 
2009) (jury verdict for defendant affirmed on appeal); Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 447 F.3d 1138 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (jury verdict for defendant affirmed on appeal); Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., No. CIV.A. 
397CV0638-H, 2001 WL 1442340 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2001), aff’d, 330 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003), 
reh’g en banc denied, 71 F. App’x 443(5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003) (jury verdict 
for plaintiff overturned by judgment as a matter of law for defendant; affirmed on appeal). 
 325. Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitation of Federal Civil Rights 
Protection, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 275, 330 (2001) (noting how courts narrowly construe § 1981, resulting in 
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A. In State Court 
1. Motions to Dismiss 
A total of nine decisions from state courts involving motions to dismiss 
were studied.326  Of those, only one was decided in favor of the plaintiff at the 
trial court level,327 with the remaining eight cases finding for the defendant.328  
Figure 2 shows that half of the dismissals were affirmed and approximately 
one-third (37.5%) were reversed. 
 




 326. See infra note 322. 
 327. Chestnut Hill Coll. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 158 A.3d 251 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2017). 
 328. Winchell v. English, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Ct. App. 1976) (reversed trial court); Reed v. 
Hollywood Pro. Sch., 338 P.2d 633 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1959) (affirmed trial court); Coleman 
v. Middlestaff, 305 P.2d 1020 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1957) (affirmed trial court); Lambert v. 
Mandel’s of Cal., 319 P.2d 469 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1957) (reversed trial court); McGill v. 830 
S. Mich. Hotel, 216 N.E.2d 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (reversed trial court); Kiray v. Hyvee, Inc., 716 
N.W.2d 193 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006) (affirmed trial court); Lopez v. Howth, Inc., 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 386 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002), aff’d, 806 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (affirmed trial court); Phila. 
Elec. Co. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 290 A.2d 699 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1972) (at trial level, 
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 When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true the 
factual allegations set forth in the complaint and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.329  In each case where the plaintiff defeated 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court employed a broad reading of the 
statute at hand. 
In Chestnut Hill College v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 
the court held that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act does not absolutely 
exclude Catholic colleges and universities from its coverage.330  Defendant 
was a Catholic college accused of unfairly expelling an African American 
student.331  The court held that the college failed to cite any authority to 
establish it was equivalent to private, parochial primary and secondary 
schools.332  The court decided that it would have been premature to grant 
defendant’s motion to dismiss at this stage as the record remained 
significantly undeveloped.333 
Some courts have considered the function of the place alleged to be a 
public accommodation and analogized it to those specifically enumerated by 
the statute.  In Lambert v. Mandel’s of California, the location at issue was a 
retail shoe store.334  While not specifically enumerated by section 51 of the 
California Civil Code, the court held it to be similar in function to those that 
were because it was “open to the public generally for the purchase of 
goods.”335  Accordingly, it too was deemed to be a place of public 
accommodation and covered by the statute.336 
Two courts relied on legislative intent in rejecting defendants’ motions to 
dismiss White plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination based on their association 
with Blacks.  The courts in McGill v. 830 S. Michigan Hotel337 and Winchell 
v. English338 both pointed to the intent of the legislature to support a favorable 
interpretation for the plaintiffs.339  In McGill, the Appellate Court of Illinois 
 
 329. Lopez, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. at 386. 
 330. 158 A.3d at 260–61. 
 331. Id. at 254. 
 332. Id. at 260. 
 333. Id. at 261. 
 334. 319 P.2d 469 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1957). 
 335. Id. at 470. 
 336. Id. 
 337. 216 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966). 
 338. 133 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Ct. App. 1976). 
 339. Winchell, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 21; McGill, 216 N.E.2d at 277. 
[Vol. 48: 59, 2021] The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
 
100 
cited the “obvious intention” of the legislature in extending the scope of the 
Illinois Civil Rights Act, a penal statute, to cover the instance at issue where 
the White plaintiff received discriminatory rent increases due to her having 
African American guests.340  In Winchell, the Court of Appeals cited the 
“legislative purpose” of California Code section 51 to cover the plaintiffs, 
White individuals who were discriminated against on account of their 
association with African Americans.341  Citing McGill, the Winchell court also 
broadly construed the “whoever makes any discrimination . . . on account of 
. . . color” language of section 51 to extend to discrimination based on 
association with individuals of color.342 
In contrast, a trial court case, Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission, is particularly notable for the narrow reading 
of the state statute employed by the court.343  In granting defendant’s motion 
to dismiss, it construed an electrical company’s offices to be places of public 
accommodation, but not the locations at which the services were received.344  
The plaintiffs in the case were Black customers who alleged discriminatory 
practices, such as stringent rules relating to security deposits and quicker 
termination of services for delinquencies that did not as easily result in 
termination in non-minority communities.345  The court held that the 
plaintiffs’ neighborhoods could not be considered places of public 
accommodation as they were not “physical location[s] to which the general 
public is invited to do business.”346  In the court’s view, ruling for plaintiffs 
would have had serious policy implications because the state human rights 
commission would have jurisdiction over virtually any business transaction in 
the state.347 
Like the trial level cases, victories for defendants at the appellate level 
rested on the narrow construction of the statute at issue.  Kiray v. Hyvee, Inc. 
presented an instance where the plaintiff brought suit after being suspected of 
theft and searched by the defendant’s employees upon setting off the security 
 
 340. McGill, 216 N.E.2d at 277. 
 341. Winchell, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 21–22.  The White plaintiffs alleged discrimination by defendant 
mobile home park owners for subleasing their space to Black tenants.  Id. at 21. 
 342. Id. at 21. 
 343. 290 A.2d 699 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972). 
 344. Id. at 703. 
 345. Id. at 700. 
 346. Id. at 703. 
 347. Id. 
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system as she was leaving.348  The Iowa Court of Appeals dismissed her claim 
for failing to prove the similarly-situated prong of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework for proving discrimination.349  Even taking into account the more 
lenient Callwood test, which allows for the establishment of a prima facie case 
in the absence of a similarly-situated comparator, the plaintiff’s claim failed 
as she could not prove the defendant’s actions were markedly hostile.350  The 
court characterized her allegations of the defendant’s employees referencing 
her race as vague and insufficient.351 
2. Motions for Summary Judgment 
We examined a total of  seventeen state court cases that were decided at 
the summary judgment stage.352  As with motions to dismiss, the results were 
much more favorable to defendants, as can be seen in the chart below.  In fact, 
Figure 3 shows that only three plaintiffs survived the motion at the trial level 
and one of them was reversed on appeal.353  Plaintiffs fared a bit better on 
appeal, where one-third of the trial court decisions granting defendants’ 
motions for summary judgment were reversed.354  The state and federal law 
claims are counted separately in the three cases where both claims were 
brought, because the state appeals courts affirmed the trial court decisions on 
 
 348. 716 N.W.2d 193, 195–96 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006). 
 349. Id. at 204. 
 350. Id. at 205. 
 351. See id. 
 352. See infra fig.3. 
 353. Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l Park Cemetery, 60 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1953) (Supreme Court 
vacated opinion on appeal); Webster v. TJX Cos., 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 476 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2005) (trial 
level; no subsequent history); Hudgins v. Higginbotham, 82 Va. Cir. 152 (2011) (trial level; no 
subsequent history). 
 354. Lopez v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0104, 2014 WL 354252 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 
30, 2014) (affirmed trial court); Colquitt v. Homer Mem’l Hosp., 771 So. 2d 818 (La. Ct. App. 2000) 
(affirmed trial court); McKnight v. Don Massey Cadillac, Inc., No. 218952, 2001  WL 721384 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2001) (affirmed trial court); Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 318 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1982) (reversed trial court); Kor v. Mall of Am. Cos., No. C4-99-1701, 2000 Minn. App. 
LEXIS 433 (Ct. App. May 9, 2000) (affirmed trial court); Wayne v. MasterShield, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 
917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (affirmed trial court); Davis v. Torres, No. L-5972-08, 2012 WL 1033287 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 29, 2012) (affirmed trial court); Turner v. Wong, 832 A.2d 340 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (reversed trial court); Oklahoma Human Rights Comm’n v. Hotie, Inc., 
505 P.2d 1320 (Okla. 1973) (reversed trial court); Parsons v. Henry, 672 P.2d 717 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) 
(affirmed trial court); Phillips v. Interstate Hotels Corp. No. L07, 974 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. 1998) 
(affirmed trial court). 
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the federal claims but reversed them on the state law claims.355 
 




Summary judgment is properly granted where, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the record indicates that 
there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.”356 
In three cases, the court found that a defendant’s establishment was not a 
place of public accommodation.  As did the court in Philadelphia Electric 
discussed above, the court in Arnett v. Domino’s Pizza I, L.L.C. based its 
decision on a narrow reading of Title II to confine discrimination in public 
accommodations to that which occurs “on the premises” of the establishment, 
 
 355. Clarke v. Kmart Corp., 495 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (affirmed trial court on 
plaintiff’s federal public accommodations law claim; reversed trial court on state civil rights act claim); 
Arnett v. Domino’s Pizza I, L.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 529 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (affirmed trial court on 
federal claim (TITLE II); reversed on state law claim); Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 20 P.3d 447 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (affirmed trial court on federal § 1981 claim; reversed on state law claim). 
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and not elsewhere, such as the homes of the customers which the 
establishment serves.357  It affirmed Domino’s motion for summary judgment 
on the Title II claim, but reversed the lower court’s grant for summary 
judgment on plaintiff’s Tennessee Human Rights Act claim.358  Citing 
legislative intent to prohibit discrimination, the court held that Domino’s was 
a place of public accommodation under the state law by virtue of its being “an 
establishment which supplies goods and services to the general public.”359 
Plaintiffs’ failure to prove discriminatory intent allowed defendants to 
prevail at the summary judgment stage.  Allegations of poor service, or a 
refusal of service, are deemed insufficient in the absence of evidence of 
specific racial animus.360  Even the phrase “you people” is inadequate 
evidence for a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment if there is 
no overt reference to race.361  Moreover, a claim that defendant overtly 
referred to her race may still fail when plaintiff brought suit against an 
employer of the persons who uttered the racial slurs.362 
Overt references to Harold and Shirley Ledsinger’s race enabled their 
claim to survive summary judgment when they were uttered as Harold was 
being kicked out of an auto parts store.363  The plaintiffs brought suit after 
Harold was subjected to racial epithets while trying to complete a purchase at 
the defendant’s establishment.364  The suit was dismissed through summary 
judgment at the trial level.365  However, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
 
 357. 124 S.W.3d at 529.  The case consisted of ninety-two plaintiffs who sued Domino’s for not 
delivering food to African American customers in a neighborhood of Memphis.  Id. at 531. 
 358. Id. at 536–37, 539. 
 359. Id. at 539. 
 360. See Lopez v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0104, 2014 WL 354252, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. Jan. 30, 2014) (unreported); McKnight v. Don Massey Cadillac, Inc., No. 218952, 2001 WL 
721384, at *3, *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2001) (unreported); Colquitt v. Homer Mem’l Hosp., 771 
So. 2d 818, 820 (App. Ct. La. 2000). 
 361. See McKnight, 2001 WL 721384 at *4. 
 362. See Davis v. Torres, No. A-1951-10T4, 2012 WL 1033287, at *4–5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Mar. 29, 2012) (unreported). 
 363. Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 318 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); see also Turner v. 
Wong, 832 A.2d 340, 255–56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (demonstrating the state court’s 
treatment of summary judgment motion in a discrimination case where a store customer left before 
completing the desired transaction after being called a racial slur). 
 364. Ledsinger, 318 N.W.2d at 560 (“It is alleged that in front of and within the hearing of third 
parties, defendant called Harold Ledsinger a ‘n-----’ and told him that he should get his ‘black ass’ out 
of the store.  In addition, it is alleged that defendant stated that he ‘did not want or need n----- 
business.’”). 
 365. Id. at 560. 
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reversed summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim made under the state’s Elliot-
Larsen Civil Rights Act.366  The key factor in the court’s reversal was the 
presence of overt racial epithets, leading to a reasonable inference that Harold 
Ledsinger was denied service on account of his race.367 
In another Michigan case, Clarke v. Kmart Corp., the plaintiff was able 
to survive summary judgment because the Court of Appeals held that an 
outright denial of access to goods and services was not required to establish a 
violation of the state’s civil rights act.368 
In the cases involving § 1981 claims, the stage at which the contested 
transaction occurred was a factor that often led to a favorable result for 
defendants.  Courts granted summary judgment where the plaintiff had not yet 
initiated the transaction, such as where the plaintiff was merely looking at 
goods, or in situations where the transaction was already complete.369 
B. In Federal Court 
1. Motions to Dismiss 
We analyzed seventeen federal appellate court decisions involving 
motions to dismiss.  At the trial court level, every decision resulted in a 
dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims.  On appeal, fourteen of these decisions were 
affirmed,370 and only three decisions were reversed in favor of plaintiff.371  The 
three reversals involved § 1981 claims.  The dismissals of plaintiffs’ Title II 
claims were all affirmed on appeal. 
 
 366. Id. at 563, 565. 
 367. Id. 
 368. 495 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
 369. See Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 20 P.3d 447, 457 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 370. Shin v. Am. Airline, Inc., 726 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2018) (mem.); Taylor v. Royal Ahold NV, 
694 F. App’x 931 (4th Cir. 2017); Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 697 F. App’x 526 (9th Cir. 
2017); Strober v. Payless Rental Car, 701 F. App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2017); Rodgers v. Curators of Univ. 
of Mo. Sys., 634 F. App’x 598 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Hammond v. Kmart Corp., 733 F.3d 360 
(5th Cir. 2013); Lopez v. Target Corp., 676 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2012); Bishop v. Henry Modell & 
Co., 422 F. App’x 3 (2d Cir. 2011); Dunaway v. Cowboys Nightlife, Inc., 436 F. App’x 386 (5th Cir. 
2011); Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2009); Billelo v. Kum & Go, LLC, 374 F.3d 
656 (8th Cir. 2004); Garret v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2002); Stearnes v. Baur’s Opera 
House, Inc., 3 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1993); Bonner v. S-Fer Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 19 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 371. El-Hallani v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 623 F. App’x 730 (6th Cir. 2015); Barfield v. Commerce 
Bank, N.A., 484 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2007); Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285 
(5th Cir. 2004). 
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A common issue among the Title II cases was whether the plaintiff had 
exhausted their administrative remedies before heading to court.  Where a 
state or local law prohibits the act or practice at issue, a suit pursuant to Title 
II may not be brought before the expiration of thirty days after delivering 
notice of the claim to the state or local authority.372  Courts tend to be strict in 
their enforcement of this prerequisite.  For example, in Strober v. Payless 
Rental Car, dismissal was affirmed against a pro se plaintiff who failed to 
exhaust her state remedies before filing suit in federal court.373 
Another case from the Eighth Circuit, Billelo v. Kum & Go, L.L.C., 
involved a plaintiff who, in the words of the court, “apparently attempted to 
comply with the procedural requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c).”374  
Billelo filed a written notice complaining about a discriminatory practice to 
 
 372. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c) (2010). 
 373. 701 Fed. Appx. at 913 n.3 . 
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the Human Relations Director of the City of Omaha, Nebraska.375  The appeals 
court nonetheless affirmed the dismissal based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.376  The court cited state law expressly declaring that 
the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission administered public 
accommodations laws.377  Accordingly, Billelo’s filing notice to the Omaha 
Human Relations Director, while an attempt to comply with the requirements 
of 2000a-3(c), was in error and fatal to his Title II claim.378 
An important argument in defeating § 1981 claims involves the question 
of a defendant’s interference with a plaintiff’s ability to contract.  Garrett v. 
Tandy is a case where the plaintiff was accused of the theft of a laptop after 
he purchased goods at a RadioShack store.379  The manager who called the 
police stated that all customers who were in the store during the same 
timeframe as the plaintiff were suspected, but the court held this statement to 
be “patently false.”380 
Garrett advanced two theories as to why RadioShack was liable under 
§ 1981, neither of which were persuasive to the court because he was able to 
complete his purchase.381  The first theory was that being surveilled and 
accompanied by employees the entire time he was in the store interfered with 
his ability to make desired purchases.382  The court disagreed, noting that the 
employees who accompanied Garrett were helpful and courteous; they 
facilitated Garrett’s purchases rather than impeding them.383  The court also 
noted that stores have legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for escorting 
customers: to prevent shoplifting and vandalism of store property.384  Garrett’s 
second theory was that the police deprived him of the enjoyment of his 
purchases by intruding upon his household in search of the laptop.385  The 
court found this contention to be a closer call, but nonetheless rejected it as 
well.386  It held that Garrett’s transaction with RadioShack was complete by 
 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at 659, 661. 
 377. Id. at 658–59. 
 378. Id. at 659. 
 379. 295 F.3d 94, 96 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 380. Id. at 97. 
 381. Id. at 101. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. at 101–02. 
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the time he had returned home because it was consummated when he 
successfully made his purchase while still at the store.387 
Hammond v. Kmart Corp. involved a plaintiff who complained of 
discriminatory behavior by a Kmart employee “while she was placing items 
on hold in a layaway transaction.”388  After giving the clerk her ID, the clerk 
insinuated that Hammond was a thief and referred to the ID as a “liquor ID.”389  
The clerk further claimed that she used to live near plaintiff’s neighborhood, 
but was forced to move due to incidents with “porch monkeys” in the area.390  
Citing Garrett, the court affirmed the dismissal in favor of defendant, noting 
that Hammond did not allege that the actual transaction itself was thwarted.391  
Given that Hammond’s transaction involved making payments in 
installments, she had multiple opportunities to show that she was impeded 
from making payments, but failed to do so.392 
As mentioned, the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims was reversed in only 
three cases, two of which we describe here.  Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-
Chevrolet Inc. involved a plaintiff who endured racial epithets and forcible 
removal from a dealership after getting into an argument with employees who 
refused to perform repairs on his vehicle.393  The district court granted 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that Causey could not prove he was 
the victim of discriminatory service.394  The dealership claimed it wanted to 
avoid working on Causey’s vehicle because the car was covered by the 
warranty.395 
The court of appeals reversed the dismissal, finding that the use of direct 
epithets by an employee of authority (the manager) and outright refusal of 
service violated § 1981.396  In so holding, the court specifically pointed to the 
“liberal pleading standard” put forth by the Supreme Court in which courts 
must “view[] the complaint as a whole, rather than any one statement in 
 
 387. Id. at 101. 
 388. 733 F.3d 360, 361 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 365. 
 392. Id. at 364–65. 
 393. 394 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 394. Id. at 288. 
 395. Id. at 287–88. 
 396. Id. at 289–91. 
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In El-Hallani v. Huntington National Bank, two Arab American plaintiffs 
brought suit after the defendant bank closed both of their bank accounts 
without warning.398  An employee of the bank testified that the bank’s 
quarterly lists of accounts to close “contained large numbers of accounts held 
by people . . . of Middle Eastern descent.”399  The employee further testified 
that the bank did not pressure employees to close similar accounts held by 
people who were not of Middle Eastern descent.400 
The trial court dismissed the case, holding that plaintiffs could only 
demonstrate that discrimination was possible, not plausible, and that plaintiffs 
failed to identify any similarly-situated members of a non-protected class who 
were treated differently.401  The trial court premised the plausibility standard 
on the precedent set forth by the Twombly and Iqbal cases.402  Under the 
combined standard, a plaintiff is required “to have a greater knowledge . . . of 
factual details in order to draft a ‘plausible complaint.’”403 
Reversing the dismissal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 
that the trial court interpreted the Twombly and Iqbal standard too narrowly.404  
Plaintiffs need only allege enough factual content to allow a court to draw a 
reasonable inference of discrimination informed by “judicial experience and 
common sense.”405  Although the plaintiffs did not put forth highly specific 
evidence, it was sufficient to meet the low bar established under precedent 




 397. Id. at 289. 
 398. 623 F. App’x 730, 731 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 399. Id. at 732. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. at 732–33. 
 402. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007)).  
 403. El-Hallani v. Huntington Nat. Bank, No. 13-cv-12983, 2014 WL 988957, at *1, *5 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 13, 2014), rev’d 623 Fed. App’x 730 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 404. El-Hallani, 623 F. App’x at 739.  
 405. Id. at 734. 
 406. Id. at 739. 
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2. Motions for Summary Judgment 
Next, we examined the twenty-nine appellate decisions involving motions 
for summary judgment, all of which initially favored the defendants.  Of those, 
almost two-thirds were affirmed on appeal (62.1%). 
Again, plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims fared better than their Title II claims.  Of 
the twenty-two cases where § 1981 claims were brought, more than half  
resulted in  reversals in favor of the plaintiffs on appeal (54.5%).407  Figure 5 




 407. Menchu v. Legacy Health, 669 F. App’x 361 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirmed for defendant); 
Dunaway v. Cowboys Nightlife, Inc., 436 F. App’x 386 (5th Cir. 2011) (reversed for plaintiff); 
Withers v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 636 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirmed for defendant); Jones 
v. J.C. Penney’s Dep’t Stores Inc., 317 Fed. App’x 71 (2nd Cir. 2009) (affirmed for defendant); Keck 
v. Graham Hotel Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2009) (reversed for plaintiff); Green v. Dillard’s, 
Inc., 483 F.3d 533 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversed for plaintiff); Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., 490 
F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirmed for defendant); Banks v. Bank of Am. N.A., 505 F. Supp. 2d 159 
(D.D.C. 2007) (reversed for plaintiff); Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 
2006) (reversed for plaintiff); Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 447 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) (reversed for 
plaintiff; remanded to trial where jury found for defendant on the § 1981 claim, which was then 
affirmed on appeal); Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662 (4th Cir. 2004) (reversed for plaintiff); 
Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversed for plaintiff); Lizardo v. Denny’s, 
Inc., 270 F.3d 94 (2nd Cir. 2001) (affirmed for defendant); Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 
F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversed for plaintiff); Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 
851 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirmed for defendant); Singh v. Walmart Stores, 225 F.3d 650 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(affirmed for defendant); Bagley v. Ameritech Corp., 220 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirmed for 
defendant); Vaughn v. N.S.B.F. Mgmt., Inc., 114 F.3rd 1190 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirmed for defendant); 
Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirmed for defendant); Alexis v. 
McDonald’s Rests. of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirmed for defendant); Perry v. 
Command Performance, 945 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1093 (1992) (reversed 
for plaintiff); Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 915 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1990) (reversed for plaintiff). 
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FIGURE 5 | FEDERAL APPEALS COURT DECISIONS ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS 




In contrast with the mixed outcomes for § 1981 claims, only one of the 
decisions regarding Title II claims was reversed on appeal in favor of the 
plaintiff,408 while six were affirmed.409 
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FIGURE 6 | FEDERAL APPEALS COURT DECISIONS ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS 




The most common reason cited by courts in affirming summary judgment 
was that the defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for their 
behavior.410  One such reason is when the defendant suspected the plaintiff of 
theft.  Jones v. J.C. Penney’s Department Stores Inc. involved a plaintiff who 
brought suit after being arrested for suspected shoplifting from defendant’s 
store.411  The appeals court affirmed the grant of defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment because Jones could not present any direct evidence of 
racial animus to rebut defendant’s proffered interest in preventing 
shoplifting.412  Jones did put forth evidence that a manager of defendant’s 
store stated a seemingly inconsistent reason (“among other reasons”): that 
Jones, an African American woman, was not in an age-appropriate 
department—the women’s clothing department.413  However, the court held 
 
 410. See, e.g., Jones, 317 F. App’x at 71; Vaughn v. N.S.B.F. Mgmt., Inc., No. 95-CV-70282, 1996 
WL 426445 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 01, 1996). 
 411. Jones, 317 F. App’x at 75. 
 412. See id. at 74–75. 
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that a mere scintilla of evidence, such as this statement, was not enough to 
preclude summary judgment in favor of the defendant.414 
Vaughn v. N.S.B.F. Management presents a case where plaintiffs sued 
under § 1981 after security officers asked them to leave a mall.415  The district 
court found “no question that the plaintiffs were denied access to the mall,” 
but granted summary judgment to the defendants after agreeing they had a 
non-discriminatory reason for denying them such access.416  Similar to the 
previous case, the plaintiffs tried to demonstrate that there were 
inconsistencies in the testimony of the mall officers who provided differing 
standards for when they would ask groups to disperse.417  The plaintiffs 
additionally employed a group of seven White males, a similar number as 
plaintiffs’ group, to visit the mall and test whether they would be asked by 
officers to disperse.418 
In granting summary judgment for defendants, the district court noted that 
mall policy allowed for flexibility in officer discretion in asking crowds to 
disperse and that the White testers did not visit the mall under the same 
conditions as the plaintiff group.419  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed 
with the district court’s reasoning and affirmed the decision.420 
In cases where racial epithets were used, plaintiffs tended to be more 
successful.  An example is Green v. Dillard’s, Inc. involving an African 
American couple who were subjected to hostile treatment.421  Linda McCrary, 
a Dillard’s employee, called plaintiffs “n-----s” as they attempted to purchase 
a wristwatch and other merchandise from a Dillard’s store.422  The trial court 
granted Dillard’s motion for summary judgment holding that plaintiffs were 
able to complete their purchases before being confronted with the racial 
 
 414. Id. 
 415. 1996 WL 426445, at *1. 
 416. Id. at *3, *7. 
 417. Id. at *3–5.  One defendant said she would break up groups only if they interfered with traffic 
flow.  Id. at *4.  Another said he would disperse groups of over four people.  Id. at *4.  “Some officers 
enforced the group prohibition against families [while] others [would] not.”  Id. at *4. 
 418. Id. at *7. 
 419. Id. at *3, *7 (“The testers were sent to the mall on a week day [sic], December 22, 1994, at 
10:00 a.m. . . .  [T]he incident at issue occurred around 5:00 p.m. on a Saturday when the mall was 
crowded.”). 
 420. Vaughn v. N.S.B.F. Mgmt., Inc., 114 F.3d 1190 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 421. Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 483 F.3d 533 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 422. Id. at 535. 
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slurs.423  According to the court, plaintiffs no longer had any contractual 
interest at stake.424  In addition, McCrary’s refusal to help plaintiffs did not 
constitute a § 1981 violation because she did not prevent other Dillard’s 
employees from assisting plaintiffs.425 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision.426  Holding that § 1981 protected the plaintiffs’ right to shop on the 
same terms as White customers, the court concluded that the evidence at hand, 
the use of slurs, refusal to help them, and following them, constituted a series 
of actions which a trier of fact could determine thwarted the plaintiffs’ attempt 
to purchase the wristwatch.427  The use of slurs constituted direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent, allowing plaintiff to establish a prima facie case.428 
In Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, the appeals court reversed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant.429  The incident in 
the case concerned a mother and son who visited a private club, The Order of 
Eagles Local 555, for a party.430  They were the only two Black guests present 
and were subjected to hostile treatment and racist remarks, despite having 
been invited by the guests of honor.431  The appeals court held that because no 
White guests were turned away, trying to turn away the Watsons constituted 
a violation of their ability to contract on the same terms as similarly situated 
members of a non-protected class, thereby contravening § 1981.432 
Likewise, in Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., the defendants made 
overt statements about the plaintiff’s race.433  The fact that plaintiff was 
refused the ability to purchase a hair coloring appointment for her mother 
constituted a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the refusal was on 
race-based grounds.434  That, the court of appeals held, is all § 1981 
 
 423. Id. at 537. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1056 (W.D. Mo. 2006). 
 426. Green, 483 F.3d 541. 
 427. Id. at 535, 539. 
 428. Id. at 540. 
 429. 915 F.2d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 430. Id. at 237–38. 
 431. Id. at 238–39. 
 432. Id. at 243.  Plaintiffs’ Title II claim was dismissed on summary judgment because Local 555 
qualified as a private establishment, exempting it from Title II.  Id. at 237. 
 433. 456 F.3d 427, 435 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 434. Id. at 436. 
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requires.435  The court reversed the district court decision finding in favor of 
plaintiff’s § 1981 claim.436 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDRESSING CONSUMER DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
PLATFORM ECONOMY 
Examining cases involving discrimination in places of public 
accommodations reveals the weaknesses in our current laws as well as 
potential arguments to be made against defendant online platforms.437  Title 
II’s narrow list of places of public accommodations provides an opening 
through which defendants can escape being covered by the statute.438  As seen 
in Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, common establishments such as beauty 
salons are likely to be excluded by courts that read the statute narrowly.439  
Today, as businesses’ use of new technologies floods the marketplace, the 
antiquated listing of places of public accommodation is becoming 
increasingly out of touch.  This poses problems for plaintiffs who purchase 
goods and services from online platforms that did not exist when the statute 
was written.  Nearing its sixtieth birthday, Title II is in need of a makeover. 
The focus must be on the functional aspects of the covered entities rather 
than their mere technical features in defining places of public 
accommodations.  For example, in Philadelphia Electric Co.440 and Arnett v. 
Domino’s Pizza I, LLC,441 state courts interpreted both the state and federal 
laws as limiting places of public accommodation to physical brick and mortar 
facilities.  State and federal laws now must account for the fact that 
discrimination is just as likely to occur in the car of a ride-sharing driver or 
the home of an Airbnb host as at corporate headquarters.  Consumer 
discrimination is invidious regardless of where it happens.  As such, we 
propose that the law be amended or reinforced by regulations that broaden the 
definition of places of public accommodation to include the locations where 
 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. at 437. 
 437. See generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race 
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 Geo. L.J. 1271 (2017) (arguing public accommodation 
laws need to change to address present challenges brought by the platform economy). 
 438. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012). 
 439. Denny, 456 F.3d at 434. 
 440. 290 A.2d 699, 703 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972). 
 441. 124 S.W.3d 529, 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
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services are actually received. 
In addition, clarification is needed to guide courts in interpreting the right 
to “enjoyment of all benefits . . . of the contractual relationship.”442  This 
would require that § 1981 be amended to emphasize that a contractual 
relationship can begin before and end after the point of sale transaction takes 
place.443  In Youngblood, the court ruled that plaintiff’s § 1981 claim failed 
because the alleged discrimination occurred after he bought beef-jerky from 
defendant’s store.444  The Eighth Circuit distinguished the case at hand from 
Hampton v. Dillard Department Stores Inc., a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision.445  In that case, the court held that the defendant department store 
owed the plaintiff, Ms. Hampton, a continuing contractual duty after Ms. 
Hampton had completed her purchase at the store and then was prevented 
from using a coupon the store gave her for a subsequent transaction there 
moments later.446  According to the Youngblood court, the issuance of the 
coupon in Hampton constituted a post-sale event that created a further 
contractual duty.447 
Both changes could be achieved through statutory amendments or the 
development of a regulatory regime similar to the scheme coordinated by the 
U.S. Attorney General to prosecute fair housing discrimination claims or the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in enforcing Title VII 
claims.448  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and local 
consumer organizations could “investigate discrimination in public 
accommodations offered in the sharing economy” and enforce Title II and 
§ 1981 against wrongdoers.449 
Another obstacle that is certain to arise in the sharing economy is the issue 
of just how many host or driver denials constitute a denial of the right to 
contract on the app under § 1981.  What if one Uber driver refuses to serve a 
plaintiff, but the plaintiff is able to find another one?  In Green, the plaintiffs’ 
 
 442. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2012). 
 443. See id. 
 444. Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 854–55 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 445. Id. at 854 (distinguishing Hampton v. Dillard Dep’t. Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 
2001)). 
 446. Hampton, 247 F.3d at 1100. 
 447. Id. 
 448. See Norrinda Brown Hayat, Accommodating Bias in the Sharing Economy, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 
613, 644 (2018). 
 449. Id.  
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claim overcame summary judgment on appeal because the court held that 
while the plaintiffs may still have been able to contract through another 
employee, the denial of service by one violated their ability to contract on the 
same terms as White customers.450  If one employee can refuse service, what 
is to prevent another employee from doing so?  A consumer in the platform 
economy must not be at the mercy of the individual providers, such as drivers 
or hosts, to be able to contract. 
In addition, equipping the law for the challenges posed by the sharing 
economy should account for the “similarly situated” test.451  This test has been 
almost insurmountable for plaintiffs in traditional venues such as restaurants 
or clothing stores.452  However, online platforms have rich data about every 
transaction that consumers make through their app.453  A practical method for 
proving differential treatment involves obtaining the data through the 
discovery process and analyzing the data to identify disparities in the 
provision of services to people based on race or ethnicity (or membership in 
other protected categories).454 
This type of analysis is being used in other cases where disparate 
treatment is alleged.455  For example, social scientists have studied the traffic 
citations issued by law enforcement officers who patrol roads and 
highways.456  Comparing the proportion of citations issued by a particular 
officer to motorists based on their demographics to those written by his or her 
colleagues can provide evidence of discrimination.457 
In Commonwealth v. Lora, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
held that it is permissible to offer “statistical evidence demonstrating disparate 
 
 450. See Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 483 F.3d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 451. See Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 849–50 (2002). 
 452. See, e.g., Hynes v. Brasil LLC, No. CV H-17-2419, 2018 WL 1726157, at *3–4 (S.D. Tex. 
Apr. 10, 2018) (holding that plaintiff failed to prove others outside of his protected class were treated 
fairly because there were no other restaurant patrons in the exact situation as the plaintiff); Acey v. 
Bob Evans Farms, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-04916, 2014 WL 989201, at *10–11 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 13, 2014) 
(holding that plaintiff failed to show that non-members of his protected class were treated more fairly 
than members of his protected class and that services were refused at the restaurant). 
 453. See Kenney & Zysman, supra note 20. 
 454. See Leong & Belzer, supra note 22, at 1314. 
 455. See, e.g., Shaun L. Gabbidon, Racial Profiling by Store Clerks and Security Personnel in Retail 
Establishments: An Exploration of “Shopping While Black,” 19 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 345, 346 
(2003) https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.513.3130&rep=rep1&type=pdf.  
 456. See id. 
 457. See id. 
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treatment of persons based on their race” to meet the burden of establishing 
racial discrimination.458  Such evidence was found sufficient only to meet the 
initial burden of alleging an inference of discrimination.459  Likewise, a social 
scientist could present statistical evidence by analyzing the cancellation rates 
of a particular Uber or Lyft driver, for example. 
The analyses could inquire into whether a driver cancels more often when 
passengers are Black or Latinx than when they are White.460  Similar analyses 
could explore whether any disparities exist in the wait times for passengers of 
different races who request rides from a particular driver.  Data showing the 
ratings provided by a driver (or host) pertaining to passengers (or guests) of 
different ethnicities could be mined as well.461  The results of these types of 
analyses could reveal disparities in the race or ethnicity of the passengers (or 
guests) whose requests are canceled, who experience longer wait times, and 
who are rated more negatively after their ride with an Uber or Lyft driver or 
after their stay with an Airbnb host. 
In determining whether a host or driver treats certain people in a disparate 
manner, plaintiff’s counsel can also obtain the reviews written about the 
individual.  Again, accessing the data should be relatively easy for online 
platforms.  If a significant proportion of an individual’s reviews allege 
discrimination, then those reviews can be used as evidence against the 
individual.  In addition, counsel can present evidence of complaints filed 
against a particular driver or host. 
Furthermore, users of online platforms can gather evidence of 
discrimination by concealing their identity.  In the past, trained testers were 
needed to ferret out discriminatory practices.462  Today, anyone can conduct 
tests by creating different profiles as Gregory Selden did.  Armed with the 
results of such tests, plaintiffs are more likely to prove that they were treated 
differently than similarly-situated customers who do not belong to their 
protected category. 
One potential weapon for online platforms in defending against claims of 
consumer discrimination is § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which 
 
 458. 886 N.E.2d 688, 690 (Mass. 2008). 
 459. See id. at 701; see also Commonwealth v. Long, 152 N.E.3d 725 (Mass. 2020). 
 460. See Josh Magness, Black Passengers Wait Longer for Ubers, Taxis—and Get More 
Cancellations, Study Finds, MIAMI HERALD (June 28, 2018, 11:29 AM), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article213982579.html. 
 461. See Leong & Belzer, supra note 22, at 1312. 
 462. See Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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states, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”463  In Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. 
Facebook, Inc., Facebook successfully invoked § 230 to defeat a Title II claim 
by the plaintiff who claimed that Facebook blocked access to the Sikhs for 
Justice Facebook page at the behest of the government of India.464  Certainly, 
there are valid policy arguments that internet service providers should not be 
liable for comments that are rude or defamatory.  However, an exception must 
be carved out to remove the shield from comments and statements that are 
discriminatory and designed to discourage minority consumers from taking 
part in the platform’s services. 
Section 230 immunity may not apply if an online platform is deemed to 
force users to reveal content that may invite discrimination from other users.  
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C. 
featured an instance where the website Roommates.com was sued by local fair 
housing councils over its requirement that new members disclose 
characteristics such as sex and sexual orientation when registering a new 
profile on the site.465  Writing for the majority, Judge Kozinski stated that 
§ 230 does not provide “immunity for inducing third parties to express illegal 
preferences.”466 
Neither Uber nor Airbnb require users to disclose their race when 
registering for profiles.467  However, Roommates.com still provides an 
interesting look at how online platforms could face liability, despite § 230, 
based on aspects of user profiles that could invite discrimination.468  The 
outcome of the Roommates.com case may have served as part of the impetus 
for Airbnb to change its policy that had allowed hosts to request the photos of 
prospective guests before accepting bookings. 
Any suggestions for amending § 230 come at an opportune time as policy-
makers are currently engaged in discussions regarding the law’s future.469  
 
 463. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018). 
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2017). 
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Critical of § 230 and deeming that it “has been interpreted quite broadly by 
the courts,” U.S. Attorney General William Barr has directed the Justice 
Department to study § 230, and the consumer protection subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce has held hearings on deepfakes 
and digital deception.470  Although some politicians, including Joe Biden, 
support a complete repeal of § 230, the majority view appears to support 
limiting the law’s protections rather than scrapping it entirely.471  Carving a 
racial discrimination exception into § 230 provides one such way to limit the 
“liability shield” provided by the law and shift the balance in a more equitable 
direction between providers and consumers.472 
Finally, the decision in Harrington v. Airbnb represents an entrée for 
future victims of discrimination in the platform economy.473  In order to prove 
that a company intended to treat certain customers differently than others, 
plaintiffs can present evidence that the company received notice about 
discriminatory activity on its platform.474  If a particular design feature 
contributes to the disparate treatment of a particular group of customers, the 
company could be expected to redesign or remove the feature to avoid facing 
the risk of liability.475 
V. CONCLUSION 
Thirty years ago, social scientists turned their attention to the issue of 
consumer discrimination.  Ian Ayres conducted a pioneering study of new car 
sales in the Chicago area marketplace and found that dealership sales practices 
resulted in White men paying the least for new cars and Black women paying 
the most.476  White women and Black men were second and third, 
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respectively, in the competition for good value.477  Other researchers followed 
suit and still others explored perceptions of consumer discrimination among 
Black and White respondents.478  Recently, marketing scholars examined 
lending institutions to identify any racial disparities in their practices and 
found customer choice to be restricted due to lenders’ assumptions about them 
based on race.479 
Legal scholars studying the phenomenon of race-based discrimination 
identified potential avenues for redress for consumers of color as well as the 
shortcomings of the law in addressing the problem.  Thirty years later, we see 
that courts have not adapted to the reality of the multicultural marketplace 
where consumers face daily micro-aggressions.  Unfortunately, the subtle 
racism that pervades our society continues to infect consumer transactions, 
even those conducted via online platforms.  From a functional perspective, 
online platforms share much in common with the establishments known as 
“places of public accommodations” because they are businesses that provide 
services to and interact with the public at large.  If accountability for all 
businesses, including online platforms, cannot be achieved through market 
forces, then the law must evolve to prevent businesses from facilitating 
discrimination with impunity. 
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